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Abstract 
 In 1983, A Nation at Risk warned America of a major problem affecting its future—the 
declining quality of its public education system. Over the years that followed, education reform 
predominantly focused on fixing the system to provide quality education for all students. A 
number of school district initiated public policy reforms, such as mayoral control, that many 
thought would improve educational quality. Some school districts also increasingly rely on 
donations from private organization to help fund failing schools. This study identifies a number 
of factors that help explain this variation in the amount of philanthropic funding received by 
school districts. I find that districts with mayoral control raise substantially more private funds 
than districts with traditional elected school boards. The level of wealth in a district also has a 
significant effect on the amount of private revenue per student. Interviews with district officials 
also revealed that districts with a strong vision coupled with competent leadership and efficient 
processes are more successful in these fundraising efforts. The presence of philanthropy has been 
solidified in the education sector, as districts move towards obtaining private money to continue 
providing a public good. Inherent in this shift is the emergence of new actors and stakeholders 
invested in the educational outcomes of American schools. 
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I. Introduction 
New York City Department of Education won the Broad Prize for Urban Education. This 
$1 million prize, given annually to a school district by the Broad Foundation, is awarded to an 
urban school district that makes tremendous advances in educational achievement for its 
students.1 Despite challenging conditions and a large disadvantaged student population, some 
districts have made great strides in closing the achievement gap. The Broad Foundation utilizes 
this flagship grant to recognize districts for being models for what is attainable.   
 The Broad Foundation, in touting the accomplishments of New York City, remarks how 
from 2003-2006,“New York showed greater improvement than other districts in New York state 
serving students with similar income levels in reading and math at all grade levels.”2 The results 
in New York were great, indicating that the policies and practices in the district had translated 
into positive outcomes. New York had stiff competition for this prize. Long Beach Unified, 
Miami-Dade County Public Schools, Bridgeport Public Schools, and Northside Independent 
were also named finalists.3 Similar to New York, students in these districts had great academic 
achievement gains in math and reading as well.  
 Why did New York win over all others? What did the Broad Foundation see in New York 
that it did not see in the other four? Bloomberg joked in his acceptance speech that he had only a 
small part in this. He remarks, “I made a couple of good decisions. I picked Dennis Walcott as 
the deputy mayor and then Joel Klein as our chancellor.”4 Herein may lay the answer – the 
mayoral control of the New York City Department of Education. An elected school board 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “The 2007 Broad Prize for Urban Education,” The Broad Prize for Urban Education, accessed March 24, 2014, 
http://www.broadprize.org/asset/TBP2007Brochure.pdf 
22 “The 2007 Broad Prize for Urban Education: Announcement of the Winner Celebratory Luncheon and Keynote 
Address,” The Broad Prize for Urban Education, http://www.broadprize.org/asset/TBP2007Brochure.pdf 
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid. 
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governs the remaining four districts, whereas a mayorally appointed leader leads New York’s 
Department of Education. Perhaps Mayor Bloomberg’s involvement in the school system was a 
factor in the Broad Foundation’s decision to award the prize.  
 A number of cities shifted control of schools from school boards to mayors to help and 
improve educational outcomes in failing school systems. Early adopters included Boston and 
Chicago, making the switch in governance in the early 1990s.5 Over the course of the next 
decade, other large cities followed suit. Bloomberg, commenting on his mayoral control, 
remarked “[The State Senate] preserved a system of clear accountability for our schools that has 
produced clear and dramatic results from our students.” Across cities implementing these change, 
similar positive rhetoric exists.  
 Over this same time span, there has been a heavy increase in the presence of large 
foundations entering the K-12 public education landscape. In addition to the Broad Prize, other 
major foundations have made multimillion contributions to produce systemic change in school 
systems. From funds aimed at improving district-charter relationships to grants developing new 
teacher evaluation systems, private funds are increasingly used in school districts across the 
nation.   
This study aims to investigate the role that philanthropic organizations play in supporting 
public school districts, by answering the following questions. First, why do some districts receive 
funding from philanthropic foundations, while others do not? In other words, what factors 
explain the variation in private contribution funding levels? Second, why are districts 
incentivized to implement reforms? Lastly, this study seeks to determine the intersection of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Kenneth K. Wong and Francis X. Shen, “Big City Mayors and School Governance Reform: Case of School 
District Takeover,” Peabody Journal of Education 78 (2009): 1.	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previous two:  How have philanthropic organizations impacted the reform developments in 
American school districts? 
My statistical analyses show that mayoral control is a significant determinant of the 
amount of private contributions that a district receives.  Districts that have switched governance 
from elected school boards to a type of mayoral control receive significantly more funds from 
private sources. This study also finds that the percentage of wealthy households in a district 
increases the amount of funding received. From the qualitative analysis and interviews with 
school district, I also find that the district specific culture affects the amounts raised from private 
sources. School districts that set a clear vision, hire competent leaders attending to grant 
development, and strong supporting capacity are able to successfully raise private revenue.  
 This paper is organized as follows: The first portion of the paper presents the relevant 
context and literature related to the educational landscape in America. Part II provides an 
overview of education reform in America. Part III explains the role that philanthropy has played 
in K-12 public education. Part IV through VI highlights the relevant literature related to mayoral 
control, teacher unions, and financial constraints.  
 The next portion of the paper presents the hypotheses and the analysis from an individual 
district, a national sample of districts, and most districts in California. Part VII explains my three 
main hypotheses. Part VIII and IX describe in great detail the philanthropic contributions 
received by Santa Ana Unified School District. The purpose of these sections is to highlight 
important aspects and patterns of philanthropic giving. Parts X through XIV cover methods and 
results for both statistical tests and the interviews conducted on a national sample of school 
districts. Part XV situate the results and findings presented in these sections in a public 
administration framework. Parts XVI and XVII will cover methods, results, and analysis of the 
7 
statistical tests performed for the sample of districts in California. Lastly, Part XVII 
comprehensively summarizes the main findings and implications of private philanthropy on the 
educational system in the United States.  
 
II. An Overview of Education Reform 
 Facing more than a $300 million budget shortfall, Philadelphia Public Schools was forced 
to close schools, lay off support staff, and cut programs in the district in 2013.6 These budget 
problems almost caused a delay in the beginning of the 2013-2014 school year. 7  In a last minute 
effort, the district was able to borrow $50 million to ensure a proper start date. These budget 
challenges arose from a variety of reasons including rising pension costs and limited funding 
from the state. Although Philadelphia is dealing with the issue on a short-term basis, the actions 
they take have implications on the education of students their students receiving. With many 
students relying on the aides and counselors as well as specific programs that no longer exist, 
quality of the education has suffered.   
 Philadelphia’s troubles are just one particular instance of how American public school 
systems are facing tremendous challenges in providing quality education to the students they 
serve each and every year. Many schools across the country, especially in large urban centers, 
face similar budget constraints and limited resources. As a result, students are being educated in 
environments that are not conducive to their learning. There has been growing literature 
documenting the achievement gap present among the students that are being educated. Children 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Trip Gabriel, “Budget Cuts Reach Bone for Philadelphia Schools,” The New York Times, June 16, 2013. 
7 Rick Lyman and Mary Williams Walsh, “Philadelphia Borrows So Its Schools Open on Time,” The New York 
Times, August 15, 2013  
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of low-income communities are not achieving at the same level compared to their more affluent 
peers.8 A similar gap is also seen between non-white students and their white peers.  
  Problems with the school system are not recent developments in the educational system 
of this country. Rather, issues have been persistent in the school system for decades, prompting 
legislative solutions. The passage of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in 1965, as 
part of Johnson’s “War on Poverty,” was one such piece of legislation that promoted equitable 
access to education.9 This law spurned the development of educational interest groups, resulting 
in a new political landscape in the realm of education. On the liberal side, teacher unions were 
prominent political actors who advocated for more funding for education.10 Besides funding, 
teacher unions opposed other federal interventions including the imposition of curriculum and 
accountability standards.11  Teacher unions prefer to use their political clout to work at the local 
government. Through bargaining with school boards, teacher unions are able to secure contracts 
that have beneficial employment policies.12 On the opposing side, conservative interest groups 
also believed that the federal government should not be a force in public education, but rather an 
issue left up to state and local governments.13 As a result of federal intervention, money seemed 
to be the only apparatus used to effect change in the school environment.  
In 1983, a study commissioned by the Reagan administration highlighted the failings of 
the public education system across the country. A Nation at Risk, released by the National 
Commission on Excellence in Education, stressed the necessity to improve teacher quality and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Kenneth Wong, Funding Public Schools: Politics and Policy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999).  
9 “Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA),” State of Washington’s Office of Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, accessed October 29, 2013, http://www.k12.wa.us/esea/ 
10 Elizabeth DeBray-Pelot and Patrick McGuinn, “The New Politics of Education: Analyzing the Federal Policy 
Landscape in the Post-NCLB Era,” Educational Policy 23 (2009):18. 
11 Ibid., 19.  
12 Terry M. Moe, “Collective Bargaining and The Performance of the Public Schools,” American Journal of 
Political Science 53 (2009): 157.  
13 DeBray-Pelot and McGuinn, “The New Politics of Education,” 20.	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make drastic curricular changes. 14 Despite political efforts aimed at increasing federal funding to 
school districts, the report determined that the quality of education was problematic. This report 
had widespread consequences in sparking the reform movement in response to the “crisis” faced 
by the nation. However efforts were largely confined to the state and local level, with many 
states proposing plans for improving their curriculum.15  
 School reform, in more recent years, has addressed education problems in a different 
manner. Rather than focusing on financial equality among the districts, various reforms have 
evolved to emphasize accountability of student and teacher performance.16 With these new goals, 
the role of testing has increased in the educational landscape. As McDonnell notes, “the basic 
policy idea of holding schools externally accountable through standardized testing of their 
students is now well-institutionalized.”17 With a shift in focus, the political actors involved in 
pushing and promoting policy has changed and thus, policy feedback encourages different 
interests groups to emerge.  
 
III. Philanthropy In Education  
 To get an understanding of philanthropic giving, it is necessary to understand both the 
history and the role it plays in society.  Currently, large philanthropic organizations such as the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Broad Foundation, and the Walton Family Foundation 
are key players in the education reform movement. Through multimillion-dollar grants, these 
foundations have influenced policies in school district across the nation. However, these large-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 “A Nation at Risk,” US Department of Education, accessed October 29, 2013, 
http://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/risk.html	  
15 Sarah Reckhow, Follow the Money: How Foundation Dollars Change Public School Politics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 17. 
16 Lorraine M. McDonnell, “Educational Accountability and Policy Feedback,” Educational Policy 27 (2012): 172. 
17 McDonnell, “Educational Accountability,” 173. 
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scale foundations are not the only foundations giving money to school districts. Despite the 
attention and special treatment given to these large foundations, there are about 60,000 
foundations that are active in the United States.18 Around a quarter of the money from these 
foundations goes to the education sector. Therefore, there is a broader set of foundations 
involved in educational philanthropy that many realize.19   
 Frederick M. Hess is one of the prominent scholars in the field of educational 
philanthropy—a field largely unstudied. He comments “We think it’s there, it seems to matter, 
and we see traces of its influence, but we’re not sure how much there is, where it is, what it does, 
or how it works.”20 Hess sketches the origins of private giving to understand current trends in a 
historical context. Hess indicates that giving originally was largely a localized activity. People 
gave to causes that they had ties to, in order to help out their local community.  
In the beginning of the 20th century, this local trend still remained but many national 
foundations began to provide charitable services.  These prominent foundations – Carnegie, 
Rockefeller, and Ford among others– were some of the first to engage in educational 
philanthropy.  These foundations focused their efforts in a variety of sectors, but still held 
education as a priority.21  Hess and Colvin indicate that many important accomplishments arose 
from this support including the start of Teachers College at Columbia, schools for African 
Americans in the Jim Crow South, and the founding of the Educational Testing Service, among 
others.22 However, as mentioned earlier, A Nation at Risk sparked a strong need to “fix” 
America’s failing schools in order to create a better future in America. More philanthropies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Frederick Hess, With the Best of Intentions: How Philanthropy is Reshaping K-12 Education (Cambridge: 
Harvard Education Press, 2005), 1. 
19 Ibid.   
20 Ibid., vii. 
21 Ibid., 1.	  
22 Richard Lee Colvin, “A New Generation of Philanthropists and Their Great Ambitions” in With the Best of 
Intentions, ed. Frederick Hess (Cambridge: Harvard Education Press, 2005), 24. 
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entered the education sector to work to implement changes in grad requirements, bolster 
standards, and professionalize teaching. Because of slow implementation, many foundations 
such as the Pew Trusts, Atlantic Philanthropies, and others began targeting their money 
elsewhere. As Michael Bailin, president of the Clark Foundation, noted, “large public systems 
are slow to reform, if not inherently intractable.”23  
The exit of traditional actors coupled with the dire state of the school system invited new 
philanthropists onto the stage. In the early 2000s, Broad, Gates and Walton began entering the 
educational sector in their philanthropic work. They quickly became prominent names in the 
field, in part because of their multimillion-dollar grants. Hands-on entrepreneurs and corporate 
leaders provided these foundations with the resources they need to provide such large grants.24  
Their background influenced how they approached giving. These leaders believed that traditional 
school management and bureaucratic processes didn’t work, and thus that innovative 
organizations and structures were needed. This group of donors funded alternative teacher 
certification programs and focused on changing the organization and leadership of the school 
districts to actually elicit positive change.25 Oftentimes, this type of philanthropy is considered 
venture philanthropy or engaged philanthropy, as the foundations create, monitor, and execute 
the systems they want implemented.26 
 Hess and Colvin’s detailed history indicates the rise of the new type of foundation 
involved in K-12 public education. However, besides this history, scholarship has been fairly 
limited in this arena for numerous reasons. Philanthropy, due to the very nature of its work, is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid., 26. 
24 Frederick Hess, “Introduction” in With the Best of Intentions, ed. Frederick Hess (Cambridge: Harvard Education 
Press, 2005), 6. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Richard Lee Colvin, “A New Generation of Philanthropists and Their Great Ambitions” in With the Best of 
Intentions, ed. Frederick Hess (Cambridge: Harvard Education Press, 2005), 27. 
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often given immediate positive praise. Therefore, researchers are often skeptical of critically 
assessing it. Additionally, scholars often rely on the support of philanthropic donors to fund 
research, thus often they are “eager to be on good terms with the philanthropic community.”27 
Also, researchers often partner with school districts that are vying for these particular funds. 
Therefore, these close relationships make it difficult to take a distanced stance for critical 
evaluation.  
Scholarship on educational philanthropy has been steadily increasing, which has shed 
more light on this phenomenon. Research by Frumkin notes the theory of change that 
philanthropies pursue. Frumkin notes that philanthropies donate with the theory that their inputs 
(grants) are used for a specific purpose or program. 28This program creates outputs, which must 
be measured. These measurable outcomes from the results of the program, translate into an 
overall public impact. This theory of change indicates that philanthropists work largely to be 
change-agents in schools. This aligns with the visions of the new “engaged philanthropy” of 
trying to make a positive change. Frumkin indicates there is a problem in this theory, which is 
not taken into account by philanthropies. Missing from this theory are external factors outside 
the locus of control of the donor.29 These can range from the people carrying out the program, 
the presence or absence of competing programs and the fiscal context of the area.30 Frumkin 
warns that these external factors affect the causal mechanisms and the true effects of 
philanthropic donations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Frederick Hess, “Introduction,” in With the Best of Intentions, ed. Frederick Hess (Cambridge: Harvard Education 
Press, 2005), 6. 
28 Peter Frumkin, “Strategic Giving and Public School Reform: Three Challenges,” in With the Best of Intentions, ed. 
Frederick Hess (Cambridge: Harvard Education Press, 2005), 277. 
29 Ibid., 280. 
30 Ibid., 281.	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Research in this field takes this theory of change as a given. It is assumed that 
philanthropies invest to promote specific reforms, especially in this new wave of venture 
philanthropy. Thus, research is aimed primarily at discovering what types of reforms are 
attempted and the ultimate success of these reforms. Loveless of the Brookings Institution 
investigates foundations’ views and their impact on initiatives taken. He notes that views are 
often at odds with parents and teachers.31 While foundations believe that management and 
structure is important for student educational outcomes, parents and teachers believe more in 
developing basic skills and discipline. 
Jenkins and McAdams investigate the role and impact of philanthropy in district reform 
initiatives in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Houston ISD, and San Diego City Schools.32 Their findings 
indicate that philanthropies instigated these reforms and district leadership often limited the 
ultimate success of reforms. Studies by Hannaway and Bischoff investigate the role of 
philanthropy in national education reforms of alternative teacher training. They note that 
philanthropy was crucial to getting this reform up and running, but success has not been fully 
evaluated.33 Hassel and Way, continue in this trend, noting the large financial support for school 
choice by philanthropic donors.34 Philanthropists, in all the studies, are grounded in their theory 
of change that they will have a positive public impact by instituting specific reforms.  
 In the research above, it is taken as a given that philanthropists spend money. Research 
on the success of reforms is often tied to how the district implemented the reforms, once they’ve 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Tom Loveless, “How Program Officers at Education Philanthropies View Education,” in With the Best of 
Intentions, ed. Frederick Hess (Cambridge: Harvard Education Press, 2005) 105. 
32 Lynn Jenkins and Donald R. McAdams,  “Philanthropy and Urban School District Reform: Lessons from 
Charlotte, Houston and San Diego” in With the Best of Intentions, ed. Frederick Hess (Cambridge: Harvard 
Education Press, 2005), 130. 
33 Jane Hannaway and Kendra Bischoff,“Philanthropy and Labor Market Reform,” in With the Best of Intentions, ed. 
Frederick Hess (Cambridge: Harvard Education Press, 2005), 157. 
34 Bryan C. Hassel and Amy Way, “Choosing to Fund School Choice,” in With the Best of Intentions, ed. Frederick 
Hess (Cambridge: Harvard Education Press, 2005),177. 
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already received the money. Little attention is devoted to uncovering which districts receive the 
money in the first place. Wendy Hassett and Dan Katzir, program managers for education at the 
Broad Foundation, indicate that they invest in people of the district. They write, “Our national 
flagship initiatives focus on developing the next generation of leadership talent for our nation’s 
urban school systems.”35 In the rest of their write up, they focus on what things they like to fund, 
rather than how they make decisions about who to fund. Clear patterns relating district factors to 
the funds they receive are not discussed.  
Sarah Reckhow, in Follow the Money, attempts to do just that. She attempts to uncover 
the trajectory of foundation dollars from origin to intended recipient. Reckhow’s study composes 
a data set of the top 15 education donors in 2000 and 2005 and their respective donations in each 
year.36 By examining this data, she uncovers trends as to which donors are taking over the 
philanthropic landscape and what types of districts they are donating to. She notes that of the 
largest fifteen donors, there are clear indicators of where the money is going. She finds that 
mayoral control and poverty rates are predictive factors in determining which districts receive 
funds. 37 
 This thesis expands on the work of Reckhow. Her data is based on philanthropic 
spending in 2000 and 2005. I utilize more current philanthropic donation data from 2009-2012 in 
this study. Given the prominence that large donors have received in recent years, I want to 
determine whether these trends hold up in the years following her study. Additionally, I aim to 
differentiate my research by analyzing district inputs, rather than foundational outputs. Reckhow 
limits her examination of philanthropic money to the largest 15 foundations in each year. While 
trends may exist among the top contributors, this does not encompass all philanthropic and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ibid., 231. 
36 Sarah Reckhow, Follow the Money, 37. 
37 Ibid., 23.	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private giving to education. More attention needs to be devoted to whether this applies to the 
entire scope of philanthropic giving, which encompasses much more than the largest donors.  
 
IV. Mayoral Control  
 Mayoral control is a power structure, which gives mayors a greater degree of authority 
over school systems than in districts with elected school boards.38 The powers associated with 
mayoral control vary across cities. For instance, in some cities the mayor is granted permission 
by the state to either select members of the school board or appoint a CEO to lead the public 
schools.  In others, the state can take direct control of daily operations or share the responsibility 
of school governance with the school itself.39 Regardless of the form the takeover takes, the 
stated motivation behind mayoral control is increasing the quality of the schools.  
 Much of the literature about mayoral control discusses why it emerged, the structures of 
governance involved, and how it ultimately affects student outcomes. Kenneth Wong, Francis 
Shen, Dorothea Anagnostopoulous and Stacey Rutledge are prominent scholars studying the 
different aspects of this governance structure. Their book, The Education Mayor, is a 
compilation of many of their previous studies examining this trend.  
 According to Wong, cities have adopted mayoral control of schools to improve quality of 
life, especially in cities trapped in urban decline.40 This stands in opposition to the theory that 
mayors are not taking over the schools to improve quality of life, but “rather as a political tool 
they could leverage for their advantage.”41 Despite concerns of a power-grab, Wong contends 
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that mayors focus on efforts of education, as it is a foundation upon which other sectors of a city 
can be successful. By adopting this approach, cities can initiate system wide improvements for 
the quality of the schools. This change in governance can come about in a variety of ways: 1. 
State legislation grants mayoral authority (Chicago); 2. City referenda to support state legislation 
granting mayoral authority (Boston, Cleveland, and Detroit) and 3. Voter approval of charter 
changes allowing mayoral takeover (Oakland).42  
Urban school boards are faced with significant challenges in lifting up slumping school 
systems. To improve failing schools, they must also contend with larger declines associated in 
economic and social shifts within in a city. Ann Helms, who writes about the Charlotte 
Mecklenburg School District, indicates that the election of school boards determine “whether the 
community locks in a strong, stable public school district or allows it to begin a typical urban 
decline.”43 Scholars such as Zeigler and Taibler note that this high pressure is disproportionate to 
the specialty of school board voters. Zeigler notes that due to the specialized public that school 
boards serve, their level of responsiveness is not in line with the general public.44  
Taibler notes that school board elections see a disproportionate amount of constituent 
voters, which are theorized to be “the direct beneficiaries of local government.” 45 Teacher 
unions, which have a vested interest in the election, come out in great numbers to vote. Anzia 
and Moe argue that this translates into more power for the union. Through collective bargaining 
with elected districts, unions can get beneficial provisions passed in the district labor contracts.46 
By switching to mayoral leadership in schools, single-issue interest groups, such as unions, do 
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not have undue influence on the election. Therefore, if Zegler’s theories of responsiveness hold, 
mayoral control creates a system in which the mayor is accountable for initiatives pertaining to 
the entire city.  
While mayoral control can eliminate some of the problems with school board elections in 
theory, it is unknown whether is translates into successes in practice. Wong and Shen, in 
collaboration with the Center for American Progress, strongly promote that mayoral control has 
brought about positive systemic changes, improving outcomes in the schools.47 They note that 
mayorally controlled districts bypass structural barriers by making a single office responsible for 
city school performance. They contend that these districts strategically allocate resources to 
spend more on teachers, instructional materials, and smaller class sizes. Furthermore, Wong and 
Shen note that students in mayoral controlled districts often outperformed statewide averages.48 
This governance has contributed to substantial and significant positive effects in New York City 
for 4th and 8th grade literacy and math scores. They conclude that these effects should indicate the 
great benefits of mayoral control, with a caveat that they must always be analyzing how they can 
offer the best management for the city.  
Not all scholars come to the same conclusions as Wong and Shen. A large study run by 
the Institute on Educational Law and Policy from Rutgers-Newark indicates that there is no 
conclusive evidence that there have been significant academic or achievement gains in cities 
with integrated governance.49 Tractenberg succinctly writes, “Student achievement has been the 
toughest to crack.”50 Their study indicates that this reform can lead to positive gains in 
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achievement, attendance, and test scores, but a conclusive causal mechanism resulting from the 
governance structure is not apparent. Sentiments among voters in cities such as Albuquerque and 
San Diego indicate that voters believe that mayoral control is taking away a democratic 
institution and removing their voice.51 Fung’s conceptualization of school-level democracy also 
indicates the removal of a democratic institution. By taking the power away from schools in 
having a governing body that is directly focused on a particular line of work, democracy is 
limited for citizens in a particular district.52  
 While many debate the merits and results of instituting integrated government, little 
scholarship examines its effect of attracting private donors. Is mayoral control a necessary 
condition in order for a district to receive private money? Are private donors more confident in 
the success of their grants in districts with integrated governance?  Reckhow attempts at 
uncovering the explanatory variables for private giving and finds that in 2005, mayoral control 
had a substantial and significant effect. The study from Rutgers also notes increased funding, but 
notes that it is not entirely due to governance structures. In this study, I attempt to test whether or 
not mayoral control continues to have a significant impact on explaining variations in funding 
levels.  
 
V. Union Strength 
 No discussion of educational funding and policy is complete without mention of teacher 
unions. Teacher unions are prominent actors in this arena as the members are the ones delivering 
the services of the districts—teaching the enrolled students. Teacher unions have not always had 
such a prominent role in public education. The two-decade period starting in the 1960s saw the 
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impressive growth and unionization of the teachers, after many hard fought battles to collectively 
bargain. By 1980, teachers in most school districts (except for the South) were unionized and 
under the leadership of two major national unions—the National Education Association and the 
American Federation of teachers.53 
 Liebermann theorizes that the very nature of how teacher unions operate gives them 
political clout. Teacher unions are highly organized entities and have a guaranteed source of 
revenue from member dues. Millions of members are located across the country and politically 
advocate at all levels of government.54 Studies done by Thomas and Hrebenar indicate that 
teachers unions are perceived as the most powerful interest group, outpacing farm groups, 
bankers, trial lawyers and others.55 Clearly, this development of unionization has given a great 
voice for teachers to express their viewpoints.  As Moe notes, as employees of the districts, 
teacher unions have a vested interest in rules and regulations regarding work—higher wages, job 
security, pensions, and more.56 
 Moe, extending this line of argument, theorizes that governmental institutions also serve 
to supplement their strength beyond sheer size and organization. Through considerable turnout in 
school board elections, teachers unions gain a prominent role in choosing the authorities that 
govern and regulate policies directly related to them. He writes, “democratic authority is 
essentially turned on its head, with the authorities doing the bidding of employees and 
government run for the benefit of vested interests.”57 In essence, because unions can throw 
support towards school board members, they can create policies that most align with their needs. 
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By solidifying their needs through electoral means, policies may often conflict with other 
stakeholders in education—namely parents and students.  
 Katherine Strunk and Sean Reardon’s work focuses primarily on the strength of the 
unions. Their work aligns with Moe, in that the strength of the union can be determined not just 
by the size of the union. Rather, the terms of the contracts between the union and the district, 
serve to measure the strength the strength of the union.58 Strunk, in collaboration with Grissom, 
also indicated that contracts in districts with strong unions gave less flexibility for school 
administrators than in districts with less active unions.59 Clearly, union strength influences 
policies and regulations in regards to the operations of the schools. However, it is unclear how 
this translates into philanthropic funds.  
 In regards to funding, not much has been done to investigate how the strength at the 
district level impacts donors’ decisions. In many cases, foundations implement initiatives that 
teachers’ unions are opposed to. Changes in evaluation and compensation, while created with 
students in mind, may create extra burdens for the teachers in school district.60 Furthermore, 
program officers at major foundations may implement grants and programs under the leadership 
and guidance of non-educators from other sectors. Teacher unions may oppose non-educators 
from entering the landscape, even though the foundations believe they will be the best person for 
their job.61 Hasett and Katzir, from the Broad Foundation, write that contentious union relations 
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or turmoil among management and the union” would be factors standing in the way of grant 
investment.62  
Despite potential opposition, union collaboration is possible and necessary in many cases. 
For example, Teacher Union Reform Network—a group of 30 local teachers unions from the 
NEA and the AFT—exists as a group of leaders to work towards structural reform in districts 
across the country.63 In both Denver and the District of Columbia, teacher unions have supported 
contracts implementing new reforms such as performance pay programs.64 These reforms are 
often aligned with the views of corporate philanthropy. In these circumstances, collaboration was 
indeed possible. In this study, I aim to uncover the impact of teacher unions on the private 
contributions raised by districts.   
 
VI. School Finances 
 The entrance of philanthropy into the educational sector indicates that money is a crucial 
resource. Money is needed for many aspects involved in the operations of schools—teachers, 
support staff, facilities, supplies, and more. Federal, state, and local funds are the primary 
avenues of revenues for local education agencies across the United States. Each state in the 
country utilizes a different funding formula for the school districts. Thus, revenues differ in 
districts within states and across states.  
 As mentioned in Section II on Education Reform, money appeared to be the common 
refrain of education reformers. Rather than pushing for programs to be implemented in schools, 
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there were efforts devoted to equalizing spending across districts.65 A substantial body of 
research examines the effects of equalization efforts. While examining California in the 
aftermath of Serrano v. Priest, Silva and Sonstelie note that this case contributed to equalization 
but also a decline in state spending for education.66 Later research by Baird notes that trends in 
the 1990s indicate that variations still exits, but has decreased significantly.67 Over this decade, 
variation within states declined by about 8-15%, but was already at a lower level. Across states, 
variation declined as much as 22-25%. Despite efforts for equalization, it largely was the result 
of state-focused efforts. Her findings uncovered that federal interventions and funding did not 
appropriately distribute funds to the places with highest needs.  Rather, much of the equalization 
came from state intervention.  
 More recently, the economic recession has had substantial impact on the financial 
situation of schools across the country. There have been some efforts to help schools  through the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in 2009. From this, states have received $39 billion 
for K-12 education distribution. Besides this help, states have maintained the same formulas for 
funding districts. With decreased funding and the same formulas, school districts receive far 
fewer dollars to operate. Furthermore, this decrease in formula funding has disproportional 
increases on states already dealing with fiscal constraints of a low-income student population and 
other high needs students.68 
 The Center on Budget Policy and Priorities reports on the impacts of the schools. They 
show that over the years of the recession, 30 of 46 states examined in the study have decreased 
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funding for districts. In four states, there have been declines on the magnitude of 20 percent. A 
combination of factors ranging from decreased sales and property tax revenue, combined with no 
new revenue contributes to these funding declines. The report indicates this has serious 
consequences on schools by undermining reform efforts aimed at improving teacher quality and 
student outcomes. Furthermore, there are future economic implications with unemployment 
problems (from reduced staffing) and a less-educated workforce down the line.  
The financial outlook for school districts across the country is troubling. This burden only 
adds to the challenges schools face in providing quality education for all student. Many reports 
indicate that reduced funding requires shifts in sources of funding. The report indicates that 
states are forced to become more efficient with the funds they have or raise more revenue 
through local property taxes or outside funding. Given the recent nature of the recession, little 
research has been done to indicate how financial constraints impact the different sources schools 
utilize to meet these challenges.  
 
VII. Hypotheses 
This study aims to test three main hypotheses in regards to the important factors in 
explaining variation in private contribution funding levels.  
1. Districts with mayoral control have more capacity to initiate reform. As a result, these 
districts should receive more donations from philanthropic organizations. 
Districts that utilize a takeover reform recognize the difficulty to alter the political 
structures inherent in traditional districts. Rather, by empowering the administration on the state 
and district level, districts are able to directly intervene in failing schools.69 Mayoral control, 
according to Shen and Wong, “integrates political accountability and educational standards at a 
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system wide level.”70 This system aims to create a political environment utilizes a central 
authority and decision-making system.  
Traditional districts, with elected school board members, face many different interest 
groups: parents, teacher unions, school principals, and more. Members of the board balance these 
competing viewpoints and must bargain with the different groups in order to create school policy. 
Elected school officials are voted in for one particular role – running the school system. Because 
the job of elected officials consists of this singular issue, voters are likely to cast their ballot 
based on their performance at the job. Berry and Howell find that the vote share for school board 
incumbents was directly tied to student performance under their tenure.71 This illustrates that the 
different constituents with which school members bargain, are the ones that hold the elected 
officials accountable for school performance. Because job security is tied to single-issue voters, 
elected officials must be careful in how they enact policy. Controversial school reforms that have 
yet to be tested will face scrutiny during elections, as voters are keen to performance of the 
schools and utilize elections to take action.  
 On the other hand, districts that have members appointed by the mayor do not face these 
electoral pressures. School board members appointed by the mayor are not evaluated by election 
and thus are not directly responsible to the entire population. Appointed members, in certain 
districts, are beholden to the mayor’s wishes, when the mayor retains the ability to remove 
members with opposing views. Mayors can control the agenda of the policies rather than having 
policies created out of a bargain of competing interests. Accountability still comes into play in 
this system of governance, as mayors are elected officials. However, unlike elected school board 
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members, mayoral responsibilities encompass many issues beyond schools. Because school 
policy is only a portion of the mayoral portfolio, voters evaluate a mayor on his or her overall 
performance, rather than just their educational policy. Appointed officials, as a result, become 
insulated from the electoral pressures and can enact school reforms in an easier manner.  
 In addition to in accountability, the connection between the mayor and school board also 
creates the potential for increased political support for the school system. The mayor faces 
scrutiny for the quality of the schools within his city. A particular mayor is likely to use political 
authority to ensure changes occur in order to bring up the achievement of the school system.  
With this takeover, the mayor holds capability of selecting officials that are best suited for 
enacting reforms. The mayor can take the background and experiences of people appointed to the 
school board into account. Selecting officials with a specific purpose in mind of promoting a 
reform agenda removes the fragmentation that is inherent in an elected school board. 
  The structural changes resulting from mayoral takeover should promote changes to the 
educational system. It is also apparent that foundations will engage in partnerships with district 
only under certain conditions. Support to districts, especially financial donations, comes with 
agreements that the district will follow guidelines outlined by the organization. For instance, in 
requests for proposals, the Gates Foundation pushes for measuring teacher effectiveness using 
student achievement data as well as changing teacher compensation.72 With such particular 
motives, these foundations will only funnel money to districts in which they feel they have the 
best chance of succeeding.  Constancia Warren, a former senior program officer of the Carnegie 
Corporation, indicated that the capacity of the district was influential in where foundations 
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decided to donate money.73 Philanthropic organizations are expected, as a result, to support 
districts that have mayoral control because of the increased capacity.  
2. Districts with weaker teacher unions will have more flexibility in creating district policy and 
can more easily implement school reforms. Therefore, these districts should attract more 
funding from philanthropic donations compared to districts with stronger unions.   
Teachers tend to be heavily unionized and covered by collective bargaining.74  Although 
this was rarely seen prior to 1960, teachers organized themselves into unions in order to exert a 
collective voice. Teacher unions often push for policies that increase pay and benefits, allow 
teachers more autonomy, and decrease the stakes of evaluation.75 They have self-serving 
interests and promote policies that benefit their workplace conditions.  
Governance of schools, however, is not left up to the teachers themselves. This role is 
delegated to a school board who determines how the school system operates. Elected or 
appointed school board members must negotiate with the teacher unions, who have a lot at stake 
in the ultimate decisions reached. Therefore, policies develop from bargains between these two 
constituencies. Teacher unions continue to advocate for policies that benefit themselves. 
Resulting from these interactions and negotiations are collective bargaining agreements – a set of 
regulations governing school district policy on anything from class size, evaluation procedures, 
and their role in curriculum development.76  
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According to Moe, teachers unions “have compelling incentives to be politically active, 
because their members depend on the government for their livelihoods.”77  By participating in 
elections, teachers unions attempt to exert their influence on the selection of school board 
officials. Teacher unions often come out to vote and endorse candidates in order to pick the 
people that they ultimately negotiate with. Union support has shown to be influential in ultimate 
decision making as board members are either sympathetic to union positions or understand how 
the union can influence the next election. If a member is not supportive of the union, the union 
has the option to endorse a challenger.78  
The ability for a union to actually accomplish this potential influence is often determined 
by a union’s strength. Unions across the board vary in the strength, ultimately impacting the 
collective bargaining agreements. Strunk and Grissom found that “stronger unions have greater 
influence over district policy than do weaker unions,” and that the contracts tend to be more 
restrictive.79 This produces policies that are beneficial to the teachers, while also limiting the 
scope for administrators to intervene.  
 With school reforms that aim to increase the quality of the schools, flexibility is crucial. 
Reforms such as changing teacher compensation and evaluating teachers using test scores can be 
controversial to the teachers. Therefore, administrators need to have the capability to actually 
implement these reforms, if they believe they are the most beneficial to the school system. By 
facing weakened opposition, school administrators can ensure their flexibility remains in 
deciding policies. Additionally, the weaker stance of the union can produce conditions that 
encourage cooperation between the union and district on less restrictive policies. It would be 
expected that philanthropic organizations would donate to districts with weaker unions. Weaker 
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unions would create conditions that facilitate cooperation, which in turn allows for the reforms to 
be enacted. As with the previous hypothesis, philanthropic foundations are going to donate their 
money to districts in which their goals actually have the capability to be enacted.  
3. Districts with large funding constraints will require external sources for additional funds. 
Therefore, it is likely that philanthropic foundations will donate to these districts. Even though 
it is expected that the most needy districts will receive funding, it is also expected that districts 
with the least funding constraints, should also receive more philanthropic donations as well.  
 Funding is essential for school districts to operate and provide a quality education for all 
students. Although evidence is mixed on whether more funding improves student achievement, 
constraints on the amount of revenues received will impact the districts.80  Tradeoffs within the 
district are inherent when fiscal pressures impact operation. Faced with these constraints, many 
districts tend to increase class sizes, cut programs, and decrease spending on administration.81 
Districts also can look to external sources of funding to supplement the funds from the 
government. Philanthropic foundations focus their work in education largely to “help schools 
compensate for social and economic disparities.”82 Therefore, philanthropic donations are likely 
to provide this supplemental funding in response to fiscal pressure that many districts will face.  
 Property tax revenue, which is a large source of funding for many school districts, can 
serve as one type of fiscal constraint on the district. When tax bases are not equitable across 
districts, variations in revenue across districts occur. Districts with higher property values will be 
able to receive more revenue from this source as compared to districts with lower property 
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values. Although state and federal governments attempt to equalize funding, variation among 
districts still remains.  This provides the space for foundations to enter as a source of district 
funds. In addition to differences in tax bases, laws that cap revenue from property taxes also 
place fiscal pressures on districts. In 1978, California voters passed Proposition 13, limiting 
property tax increases to a maximum of two percent annually. As a result, the number of local 
education foundations (LEFs) doubled between 1980 and 1983.83 A similar trend was seen in 
Massachusetts, when many LEFs formed in response to Proposition 2 ½ in the 1980s.84 This 
trend indicates that charitable organizations address funding deficiencies for school districts. 
These organizations will tend to focus efforts on those locations that have the most demand for 
these funds, in order to equalize the districts.   
  Budget constraints to districts are not just a result of limited local revenues. Economic 
downturns also impact the ability for states and the federal government to provide funding for 
schools, sparking a widespread wave of budget cuts for K-12 education.85 Once again, these 
budget cuts limit the ability for districts to provide similar services as before the economic 
downturn. When schools have large populations of Special Education students and English 
language learners, the budget cuts have an even greater constraint. Thus, donations from local 
foundations and large philanthropic organizations are likely to provide to these districts in need. 
 It is also expected that districts on the opposite end of the spectrum also receive large 
amounts of philanthropic donations. Even if districts do not have the same level of demand for 
philanthropic funds (i.e. high funding constraints), they might still receive large amounts of 
donations. Districts that have high property tax bases will have the supply of funds from parents. 
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These funds will be funneled to the district in the form of local education foundations. As Rob 
Reich notes in his op-ed “Not Very Giving,” parents in the district of Hillsborough, California, 
often make donations of around $2,000 per child to the Hillsborough Schools Foundation. This 
Foundation is able to make large donation requests to the parents since median income of 
households in this district  $250,000.86 Districts that are on the higher end of income distribution 
will utilize their excess supply of revenue to supplement traditional governmental streams in the 
school.  
 Consequently, districts with high demands for funds and low demands for funds should 
receive the most funding from charitable donations. Charitable giving will exist in order to meet 
the demand or in districts where supply of funds is readily available. This will leave out districts 
that are also hit by budget cuts and funding constraints, but may be as severe as others. Thus, it is 
expected that charitable giving is lower in districts that do not have a large local funding base to 
support giving from an LEF nor can gain recognition amongst the large philanthropic 
foundations.  
 
VIII. Santa Ana Unified School District Methods 
What types of donors make contributions to school districts? Where do these donors 
come from? Lastly, how are these donations used? These questions encapsulate important 
aspects of giving that must be taken into consideration when understanding and analyzing 
philanthropic contributions to public schools. 
 Santa Ana Unified was chosen as a district to look at in depth, due to its unique 
characteristics. Santa Ana has over a quarter of its children living in households under the 
poverty line. Additionally 81.7 percent of the students enrolled in the district are from a Hispanic 
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or Latino background. At the same time, this district is located in a wealthy, predominantly white 
county—Orange County, CA. This dichotomy presents an interesting case to analyze and 
understand what trends exist in philanthropic giving. This investigation only applies to Santa 
Ana Unified itself, but officials I interviewed in a number of other cities discussed similar 
patterns.   
 In Santa Ana, the school board approves all philanthropic gifts, contributions and 
donations at each scheduled meeting. The meeting minutes for Santa Ana’s Board of Education 
include this approval of donations. Records of the contributions contain information regarding 
the amount of the donation, the recipient, the identity of the donor, the donor’s location, and the 
use of the contribution. (See Appendix A for an example of Santa Ana Unified Board of 
Education minutes) 
 Minutes were collected for the 2012-2013 school year, which is the most recent school 
year completed. This school year began on July 1, 2012 and ended June 30, 2013. All donations 
from this time period, as evidenced in school board meetings, were tracked and recorded. Each 
donation was coded in three dimensions: Category of Use, Donor Type, and Donor Location. 
For the category of use, I coded donations based on 9 distinct categories. Table 1 
describes the different use categories.  
Donor type was classified into different categories as well: Company, Community 
Organization, Individual, Foundation, and University. Community Organizations included any 
organization tied to particular community such as neighborhood community non-profits, Parent 
Teacher Associations (PTAs), churches, and Athletics Booster Clubs.  
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   Table	  1:	  Use	  Category	  Descriptions	  Category	   Description	  
Instructional	  Supplies	   Classroom	  supplies	  and	  general	  supplies	  for	  the	  school	  
Field	  Trips	   Field	  trip	  related	  expenses—transportation	  and	  admissions	  costs	  
Awards	  and	  Recognition	   Recognition	  of	  students	  and	  staff	  through	  scholarships,	  certificates	  and	  awards	  banquets	  
Facilities	   Maintenance	  of	  school	  facilities	  such	  as	  playground	  and	  garden	  
Extracurricular	   Activities	  including	  art,	  music	  programs,	  and	  athletics,	  etc.	  
Technology	   Technology	  such	  as	  computers,	  televisions	  and	  iPads	  
Special	  Programs	   Special	  initiatives	  funded	  by	  the	  grant	  itself	  (e.g.	  a	  Playworks	  program	  aiming	  to	  transform	  recess	  at	  schools)	  	  
Clothing	   Shoes,	  t-­‐shirts,	  backpacks,	  etc.	  for	  all	  students	  
Political	   Expenses	  related	  to	  ballot	  initiative	  	  
  
   
 Lastly, each donation was coded according to the location of the donor. By identifying 
where the donation comes from, trends become more apparent as to how private contributions 
flow. Given the high levels of poverty in Santa Ana, it is important to understand whether the 
wealthy in the local community can support this extra funding or if private contributions 
originate from large national scale organizations. Each donation was coded according to its 
origin – 1. Santa Ana 2. Orange County 3. California or 4. Other States. These categories are 
mutually exclusive. Thus, the designation of Orange County refers to any donation from a city in 
Orange County excluding Santa Ana. The designation of California refers to any city in 
California, excluding Orange County.  
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IX. Findings from Santa Ana 
 In the 2012-2013 school year in Santa Ana Unified, there were 133 donations from 
private sources approved by the Santa Ana Board of Education. The contributions summed to a 
total of $319,386. Although donations ranged from $500 - $20,000, the mean donation was about 
$2400. Contrary to what many may believe, this indicates that the giving in the district is often 
composed of many smaller donations. Because of the clout and media attention to large 
foundations giving on the national scale, it often appears that only private giving occurs on the 
scales of multimillion-dollar grants. However, as this district illustrates, it often is numerous 
smaller contributions summing to a sizeable total. Furthermore, it is important to note the scale 
of private contributions. The total of $319,386 is considered substantial on its own merits. 
However, Santa Ana’s revenue for this school year totaled $549,756,000.87 Thus, Private 
contributions only make up .05% of this total revenue. Whether or not this remains the case in 
Santa Ana from year to year, it is evident that philanthropic donations, despite the importance, 
are not a source of income on which the district is reliant. Table 2 below illustrates some other 
useful summary statistics for the private contributions. 
Table	  2:	  Summary	  of	  Donations	  in	  Santa	  Ana	  
2012-­‐2013	  
Number	  of	  Donations	   133	  
Mean	  Donation	   $2401.40	  
Std.	  Deviation	   3361.68	  
Minimum	  Donation	   $500	  
Maximum	  Donation	   $20,000	  
Total	  Donations	  2012-­‐2013	   $319,386	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 All donations approved by the school board carried terms for its intended use. No funds 
were allocated for general use by the schools. Depending on the terms, schools had different 
amount of input in how they utilized their funds. Many donations indicated that they were to be 
used for instructional supplies and materials. Given the broad scope of this use, schools had 
flexibility with the dollars allocated in this category. On the other hand, donors could specify the 
exact items to be purchased – twenty iPads or new backpacks for all students.  
 Extracurricular activities were the category with the largest amount of private 
contributions. In Santa Ana, 21.79 percent of the funds were used to fund activities outside the 
scope of traditional instruction. Uses in this category ranged from funding mock trial 
competitions, to band instruments and art lessons. The category funded at the second highest rate 
was field trips. Donations in this category were used to cover the bussing and transportation of 
students and the fees for the activity involved in the field trip. Following field trips, instructional 
supplies along with awards and recognition were funded at similar rates. Instructional supplies 
were the broadest category for schools. It often included purchase of curricular materials, 
textbooks, and library books. For awards and recognition, donors provided money for student 
scholarships, staff recognition, and events to honor the students and staff.  The remaining 
categories, and the amount of funding can be seen below in Table 3.  
 
Table	  3:	  Private	  Contributions	  in	  Santa	  Ana	  by	  Use	  	  
Category	   Amount	   Percentage	  
Instructional	  Supplies	   $46,369	   14.52%	  
Field	  Trips	   $54,823	   17.17%	  
Awards	  and	  Recognition	   $47,302	   14.81%	  
Facilities	   $4,619	   1.45%	  
Extracurricular	   $69,625	   21.79%	  
Technology	   $40,450	   12.66%	  
Special	  Programs	   $30,496	   9.55%	  
Clothing	   $23,202	   7.26%	  
Political	   $2500	   0.79%	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When people think about districts in low-income areas, they often assume that the school 
district is underfunded. As a large percentage of the school revenue in California comes from 
local tax source, Santa Ana Unified is at a disadvantage. If general expectations are that students 
are not getting a quality education due to insufficient funds in low-income areas, then it should 
be expected that money should be used towards obtaining instructional supplies. It is plausible 
that districts trying to make up the shortfall will utilize private contributions to provide core 
academic subjects. However, Santa Ana’s private contributions indicate giving tends to be for 
other extracurricular programs 
 These activities are indeed important for the students of Santa Ana, however they are not 
essential to the functioning of the school system. This pattern can arise from numerous 
explanations. One explanation is that extracurricular activities and field trips are more expensive 
activities, thus requiring more philanthropic funds. Costs for bussing, admissions fees, 
instruments, and athletic equipment are all significant. Whereas districts can be resourceful with 
instructional resources and materials, they might not have cheaper alternatives for 
extracurriculars. To compensate for this expense, districts may actively seek funding for these 
particular high-cost items. The $40,450 raised for technology can also be attributed to this reason. 
There are many touted benefits to the district for adopting new technology, but it can come at a 
great expense. Therefore, philanthropic donors may fill this need so district can utilize their 
money elsewhere.  
 On the other hand, this could be related to the donors themselves. Donors can have 
specific intentions of their money. Oftentimes donations for field trips, athletics and arts 
programs came from organizations with a single mission – contributing to this trend.  For 
example, Godinez High School received a donation of $6,562 for the Girls Basketball Team 
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from the Godinez High School Girls Basketball Boosters organization. This agency exists solely 
to fundraise for the basketball team, thus their donation is very specified. This type of donation 
was common throughout Santa Ana’s contributions.  
 Lastly, it is plausible that this is only specific to the 2012-2013 school year. As there are 
fluctuations with state budget cuts and tax revenue, each year the district develops a new budget. 
This year, either Santa Ana could have had different needs or their private funders could have 
had different supplies. Further investigation from other school years is required to determine 
whether the percentage breakdowns in each of the categories remain relatively stable.  
 Donations to the district were also made from a wide range of donors. Table 4 illustrates 
the breakdown by donor type. The highest amount, $124,661, came from community 
organizations. These community organizations ranged in location and function, but often they 
were associated with a particular school. Organizations such as the Parent Teacher Association 
or a Boosters Club have a vested interest in the activities of the school. Because they function to 
work and support their school, one of their primary functions is raising money. Foundations also 
exist for a similar purpose. While many foundations serve other sectors besides education, I 
expected that this would be a source of many contributions.   
 Other types of donors—individuals, universities, and companies—may not prioritize 
contributions to school districts. In each of these donor classifications, the do has a separate 
primary role in society. Individuals make money to support them, companies make profit, and 
universities need to raise their own funds to operate. It falls into line that companies donate the 
next largest percentage, as companies’ profits often soar above the revenue. Even if corporate 
responsibility is not stressed, enough corporations do have a public arm to donate to important 
causes, such as education. 
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 Individuals are limited in their capacity to give. I expect that donors often have a 
connection to the recipient. Thus, for a given district, the network of possible individual 
contributors is only so large. The pool of available funds from individuals that would donate to 
Santa Ana Unified is often constrained by income distribution and geographic proximity to the 
district. In terms of the universities, these are also educational institutions that require money. 
Although they have a philanthropic side, they contend with their own development issues, thus 
serving as a potential explanation from the low funding number.  
 
Table	  4:	  Private	  Contributions	  in	  Santa	  Ana	  	  
By	  Donor	  Type	  
Donor	  Type	   Amount	   Percentage	  
Company	   $72,096	   22.57%	  
Community	  Organization	   $124,661	   39.03%	  
Individual	   $32,070	   10.04%	  
Foundation	   $87,044	   27.25%	  
University	   $3,515	   1.11%	  
   
 Tracking donor location also uncovers interesting trends within the district. Table 5 
shows a breakdown of contributions by donor location. The largest percentage of funds, 52.50%, 
comes from donors located in Santa Ana itself. While these can come from a variety of donor 
types – parents, PTAs, and companies—it indicates that the local connection is important. 
Additionally, the next highest amount, 33.79% of all private contributions, comes from the 
remaining cities in Orange County, California.  Also interesting to note is that only 8.85% of all 
private contributions come from sources outside the state of California.  
 Trends in the data indicate that a local connection is important in the funding process. 
Presumably, donors have many options when deciding where to spend their money. Donors have 
to pick a cause to donate to and then an organization that supports their cause. If they choose 
education, there are still many options. Organizations and businesses have an interest in 
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supporting their local community to improve safety and economic productivity. The large money 
coming from the remaining cities in Orange County suggest that poverty could be a factor in the 
donation process. Although other pockets of poverty exist in Orange county, the surrounding 
communities are often much wealthier than Santa Ana. Thus donors from these may choose to 
fund Santa Ana Unified because of the financial constraints and hardships of the lower income 
households in the district.  
 The low percentage of money from out-of-state, also counters public perceptions of 
philanthropic giving. When school districts receive $30 million in grants from the Gates 
Foundation to implement a controversial new teacher evaluation and compensation system, it is 
guaranteed to receive media attention. Due to this prominence in the media about the 
privatization of education, it appears as if all philanthropic giving is of this nature—large sums, 
used for controversial reforms, and national in scope. However, in reality, as the data presented 
here indicates, there are often numerous smaller donations from local sources used for basic 
needs of the school community. Given that this does not receive media attention, the public may 
not be aware of the true nature of philanthropic funds. These findings, although unique to Santa 
Ana Unified in this school year, allow for a more nuanced understanding of philanthropic giving 
in local education agencies.  Additionally, they can point to trends that may appear in other 
districts across the nation.  
Table	  5:	  Private	  Contributions	  by	  Donor	  Location	  
Donor	  Location	   Amount	   Percentage	  
Santa	  Ana,	  CA	   $167,674	   52.50%	  
Orange	  County,	  CA*	   $107,914	   33.79%	  
California**	   $15,500	   4.85%	  
Out	  of	  State	   $28,298	   8.86%	  *	  All	  donations	  received	  from	  Orange	  County,	  CA,	  excluding	  Santa	  Ana,	  CA	  
** All donations received from California excluding Orange County, CA 
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X. National Sample – Quantitative Analysis 
In order to test the hypotheses presented in Section VII, I attempted to collect data from 
28 different school districts. These districts were selected based on particular criteria, rather than 
a random sampling of all potential local education agencies in the United States. First, I 
narrowed down all possible districts to those with enrollment sizes greater than 40,000.88 Larger 
districts were chosen for this sample, as I wanted to control for the effect size had on 
philanthropic funds received. Large student populations are potentially attractive for funders 
trying to implement particular initiatives and reforms.  As these initiatives are tied to the grants 
private donors, they have a large pool of “subjects” to test the effectiveness of a particular 
program. Therefore, I eliminated smaller districts to determine other variables that impact the 
variation of funds received across districts.  Secondly, I narrowed down districts that had greater 
than 25% of children ages 5-17, living at or below the poverty line. This measure of poverty is 
used since the schools are primarily serving children aged 5-17, and the amount of students 
living in impoverished families affects the services schools provide. Because poverty is one 
explanation as to why philanthropies exist in the first place, I wanted to control the sample to 
districts that just had higher levels of poverty. Even among this sample, I wanted to see if there 
was even variation stemming from funding constraints due to the differing income distributions 
of the district.   
Lastly, I excluded any school districts that operated at the state or county level. For 
instance, many southern states such as Florida and North Carolina operate their schools at the 
county level. While they may be large districts, they cover a vast range of territories and interests. 
Since these districts represent students and families with a variety of different backgrounds and 
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needs, it can potentially influence how philanthropists determine their awarding of grant money.  
One exception in the sample is that of Memphis and surrounding Shelby County. In July 2013, 
Memphis City Schools merged with 35,000 students from the surrounding suburbs of Memphis. 
This formed an aggregate district known as Shelby County Schools.  At the end of this current 
2013-2014 school year, the school districts will undergo a de-merger into distinct Shelby County 
and Memphis City school systems.  As I’m utilizing data from prior to this merger, Memphis 
remained in this sample 
By following these guidelines, I produced a sample of 28 districts. (See Appendix B for 
list of districts in sample) The enrollment size of these districts ranges from 44,199 students in 
District of Columbia Public Schools up to 995,336 students in New York City Department of 
Education. In terms of poverty level, the lower bound is Long Beach Unified with 25.25% of 5-
17 year olds living in poverty, while the upper end is Detroit City Public Schools with 47.24% of 
children in poverty. There are multiple districts from larger states such as California and Texas, 
however there is geographic diversity in the sample. This is important in the sample, as there can 
potentially be regional differences that correlate with certain variables I have intended to study. 
Lastly, 7 of the 28 districts are mayorally controlled. These seven districts have school boards 
that were selected either by a mayor directly or by a mayorally appointed CEO/superintendent. 
Even though the degree of mayoral intervention in these seven districts differs, there is a clear 
distinction between these particular ones and districts with elected school boards.  
 The dependent variable of interest is the level of private contributions a district receives 
annually. To measure this, I used 990 forms, an annual form that 501 (c) (3) organizations are 
required to file with the IRS. This form reports an organization’s revenues and expenditures in a 
given year. I obtained these 990 forms from associated foundations for years 2009-2011.  
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 The measure that best encapsulates private contribution is from line 8 of the form: 
“Contributions and Grants” (See Appendix C for example of 990, line 8). This data point 
represents the revenues that a foundation receives in each year, excluding any revenue received 
from interest. In this analysis, the amount was divided by the enrollment size of each district to 
create a measure of private contributions per student in a given year. Other measures of private 
funding could be found in line items of a district’s annual budget. However, each district 
accounts for this in a different method. Thus, if gathered from each individual budget, the 
amount of funding would not be comparable. From interviews, many districts emphasized how 
private funds are funneled through the district’s 501 (c) (3) foundation. Although tradeoffs exist, 
as not all districts have a foundation, the 990 measure was the most comparable and consistent 
measure of outside funding for a district. Data was gathered for 15 of the 28 districts in 2009 and 
18 districts for 2010 and 2011.  
 I collected a number of independent variables to examine the hypotheses as proposed 
earlier in the paper. To test the effects of mayoral control, I coded districts based on the 
categorization of their school board. If districts had elections for their school board members, 
then they were considered “Elected” districts. Those districts that had the mayor either choosing 
the School CEO, part of the board, or the entire board were deemed “Mayorally Controlled.” 
Other studies measure the strength of the mayoral control. However, given the confines of the 
study, the dichotomy between elected and mayorally controlled is sufficient.  
 To test the hypothesis of union strength, the independent variable of union rank is utilized. 
This measure comes from a Thomas B. Fordham Foundation report entitled “How Strong Are 
U.S. Teacher Unions? A state-by-state comparison.”89 This study was a comprehensive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Amber M. Winkler, Janie Scull, and Dara Zeehandelaar, How Strong Are U.S. Teacher Unions? A State-by-State 
Comparison (Washington, DC: Thomas B. Fordham Institute, 2012), 9-12. 
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examination of the variables involved in determining the strength of teacher unions—resources 
and membership, involvement in politics, scope of bargaining, state policies, and perceived 
influence.90 Rankings were completed in each of the five key areas and averaged to create overall 
rankings for 50 states plus DC, with 1 being the strongest and 51 the weakest.  
 The rankings from the Fordham Foundation report are used to indicate the strength of the 
unions in each of the 28 districts of the sample. Districts were assigned the union rank of the 
state it was located in. Districts residing in the same state (e.g. Aldine and San Antonio) were 
given the same rank. Alternative measures such as size or membership alone serve only as a 
blunt approximation of the strength, failing to take other factors into account. Katherine Strunk 
creates a measure of teacher union strength via terms outlined in contracts. However, the analysis 
involved was only specific to California. Therefore, the rankings of the unions by state in the 
Fordham report were the most comprehensive and best suited for the districts in the sample.  
 The last hypothesis concerning financial constraints posited that districts with high 
demand for funds, as well as high supply of potential funds would bring in the most private 
contributions. High demand can be classified as districts in dire need of external funding due to 
constraints. To quantify this, I used the poverty rate of the districts. Specifically, this was the rate 
of 5 to 17 year olds living in households under the poverty line. Data was gathered from the 
National Center for Education Statistics.91 As many district officials noted in their interviews, 
providing education for students from impoverished backgrounds put a financial constraint on 
the budget.  
 I also hypothesized that districts with a high supply of potential funds would receive 
more philanthropic funds. As donations often come from the wealthy, I gathered data on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Ibid., 9. 
91 National Center for Education Statistics. School District Demographics System and Common Core of Data, 2007-
2011. https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sdds/framework/tables.aspx?ds=census&y=2010	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percentage of wealthy households in each of these districts. In this study, wealth percentage 
refers to the percentage of households earning ≥ $150,000 annually. Data for each district was 
gathered from the School District Demographics System of the National Center for Education 
Statistics.  
 Lastly, I considered district enrollment as an independent variable. After talking with 
many district officials, many noted that the size of their district was an attractive characteristic 
for grant donors. With more students, more large-scale programs can be implemented and these 
students serve as test subjects for new initiatives. District enrollment in 2010 was used for the 
enrollment variable. This data was obtained from the Common Core of Data from the National 
Center of Education Statistics.92 Even though analysis was done from years 2009-2010, the 
National Center does not compile enrollment data annually. Even though there are fluctuations in 
enrollment from year to year, the 2010 enrollment number was adequate for the purposes of this 
study.  
 I ran two-sample t-tests to determine if significant differences existed between the means 
of private contributions per student in each sample. These groups were created on the basis of 
four independent variables: mayoral control vs. elected, high vs. low poverty, high vs. low 
wealth, and strong vs. weak unions. These tests were performed for the listed comparisons for 
years 2009, 2010, and 2011. Similar to the regression analysis, these tests were performed with 
and without District of Columbia Public Schools.  
 For comparisons between mayorally controlled and elected districts, groups were created 
based on that distinction. Only seven of the original 28 districts utilized mayoral control and data 
on private contributions were collected on six. Therefore comparisons were done between 
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unequal groups, as more districts were elected. The t-tests for difference in means were 
conducted for 2009, 2010, 2011.  
 Whereas a natural categorization existed for mayoral control and elected districts, 
breakdowns for the rest of the independent variables had to be created. For union rank, I 
categorized strong unions as those with a Fordham Foundation ranking in the range 1-25. 
Districts with union rank between 26-51 were categorized as weaker unions. 
 In terms of the poverty percentage, all districts chosen for this sample were higher 
poverty, as they were chosen if poverty percentage was greater than or equal to 25 percent. 
Therefore, for the purposes of the t-test I created equal groups of districts with “high” and “low” 
poverty. Districts classified as low poverty in this sample had poverty percentages in the range of 
26.74 – 33.51. Districts deemed as high poverty had percentages ranging from 33.65 – 47.24%.  
 Equal groups were also created to compare high and low wealth districts. Districts 
grouped as high wealth had percentages ranging from 9.3 -18. Low wealth districts had 
percentages ranging from 1.8 to 8.1 percent.  
 I also modeled multivariate regressions to study the effects of all of the variables 
described above —mayoral control, enrollment, poverty percentage and wealth percentage—
jointly. The log of the private contributions per student is the dependent variable. I use the log of 
this dependent variable to reduce the influence of outliers. I ran models for 2009, 2010 and 2011, 
to see how the independent variables impacted the private funding in different years. These 
models were also created with the exclusion of DC, as the high level of private contributions per 
student appeared to be an outlier amongst the data.  
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XI. National Sample Results 
 The results of the t-tests for 2011 can be seen in the tables below, Tables 6-9. The 
remaining t-tests for 2009 and 2010 can be found in Appendix D. From these t-tests, it is evident 
that in 2011 there is a significant difference in the amount of funding per pupil between districts 
with mayoral control and elected districts. Elected districts raised an average of $25.32 whereas 
mayoral control districts raised an average of $121.02 per student—a difference of $95.70.  In 
this test, the p-value of 0.0706 indicates significance at the 0.1 level. A significant difference was 
also found between low and high poverty districts. Districts with lower rates of poverty, albeit 
greater than 25% due to the sample creation, raised on average $83.93 per student more than in 
districts with higher poverty percentages. In this test, the p-value is 0.0951. No significant 
differences are found between weak and strong union districts. 
 The mayoral control findings are consistent with my hypothesis. As expected, districts 
with mayoral control have received more money per pupil. This is in part due to the fact that 
mayoral control is a reform itself aimed to transform schools. Philanthropic donors can see these 
reforms as positive steps and contribute money to the cause. Additionally, mayoral control 
allows appointment of individuals who can be competent in controlling the grant process.  
 Differences in lower vs. higher poverty districts do not match my original hypotheses. I 
had proposed that districts with the highest need (i.e. highest poverty) would yield more 
donations. The results, however, tend to indicate that this is not the case. Rather, the results 
exhibit that those with the highest amount of students in poverty do not receive nearly as much 
money as those with moderate amounts of poverty (25-33%). Possibly districts with the highest 
levels of poverty suffer from other problems as well in their operations. This may affect how 
attractive the district is in the eyes of donors. Although this is speculation, donors may not 
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believe that their money is being put to good use in these districts. Furthermore, if the results 
from Santa Ana hold nationally, and there is a local element involved, there could simply not be 
the supply of funds in the immediate area.  
 On the other hand, districts classified as the lower poverty group, still have a substantial 
amount of students in poverty. For these districts, there are clearly challenges the district is 
facing in providing education to its students. Thus, a clear need is often met by philanthropic 
donors if there is belief that there is progress to be made in the district. At these levels of poverty, 
donors might remain optimistic about the solvability of the situation. Also, there could be other 
factors involved in creating this distinction such as the competency of the workers and the wealth 
in the area. Thus, this t-test signifies a difference exists but does not serve to explain the causal 
mechanisms behind the difference.  
 Weaker unions had on average more contributions than stronger unions, even though this 
difference is not significant. Additionally, there was no significant difference found between 
districts of lower and higher wealth. Each year illustrated that the wealthier districts raised, on 
average, a higher sum of money per pupil. These trends with wealth and union strength align 
with the hypotheses, but the results cannot fully conclude that these are the driving forces behind 
the differences. There can be many other factors involved that create the distinction between the 
two groups. Perhaps mayoral control and union strength are correlated with one another, making 
the t-test an inappropriate test for the difference. There also is the possibility that these factors 
are not important in the grant process. Other factors such as the leadership in the district or the 
business communities’ ties to the school district could play a role.	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Table	  6:	  	  Elected	  vs.	  Mayoral	  Control	  Union,	  2011	  
Elected	   Mayoral	  Control	   Difference	  25.32	   121.02	   -­‐95.70	  [1.24,	  175.02]	   [1.00,	  419.	  87]	   (49.40)	  P-­‐value:	  0.0706	  	   	   	  	   	   Table	  7:	  	  Weak	  vs.	  Strong	  Union,	  2011	  
Weak	   Strong	   Difference	  98.73	   30.81	   67.93	  [1.38,	  419.87]	   [1.00,	  185.67]	   (50.29)	  P-­‐value:	  0.1956	   	   	  
	   Table	  8:	  	  Low	  vs.	  High	  Poverty,	  2011	  
Low	   High	   Difference	  99.18	   15.26	   83.93	  [1.00,	  419.87]	   [1.38,	  44.72]	   (47.31)	  P-­‐value:	  0.0951	   	   	  
	   Table	  9:	  	  Low	  vs.	  High	  Wealth,	  2011	  
Low	   High	   Difference	  18.20	   96.24	   -­‐78.03	  [1.24,	  72.07]	   [1.00,	  419.	  87]	   (47.93)	  P-­‐value:	  0.1231	   	   	  
	   	  
	   T-tests are used to uncover any differences between two distinct groups. However, these 
are not fully adequate to analyze the financial data for the school districts in the national sample. 
The tests do not explain variation amongst the two distinct groups or indicate the effect of the 
variable on the difference. Also, as seen from the above results, additional factors may be 
correlated with the variables, producing the differences as seen in the tables. Table 10 includes 
the model of the multivariate regression for 2010 and 2011. (See Appendix E for 2009 model 
and models for 2009-2011, excluding DC) 
 The regressions indicate that mayoral control is a significant factor involved in how much 
money a district receives from private sources.  In 2010, the model indicates, that holding all else 
constant, switching from an elected school board to a mayorally controlled school system, 
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increases the amount of philanthropic funding by 159.1%. In 2011, the model indicates that 
mayoral control would create an increase by 193.4%. Even when excluding DC, an outlier due to 
the high per pupil revenue it generates from private sources, the coefficient of mayoral control 
still remains significant in 2010. 
 These results support the original hypothesis that given districts with high levels of 
poverty, serving large populations, mayoral takeover of the school has a significant impact on the 
district’s revenues from private sources. Districts who have mayoral control did not all have 
higher private contribution totals than those with elected boards, indicating other factors are at 
play. Despite this, it is clear and evident that the mayoral control has a substantial impact on the 
amount of private contributions gained by a district’s foundation. 
 Further investigation could discover further implications of this mayoral control. This 
study did not examine whether other factors related to mayoral control. Studies could examine 
how the length of time mayoral control has been in the district can affect the funding levels from 
private sources. Additionally the trend is significant and grows from 2010 to 2011. This is not 
guaranteed to be the case every year, so there might be some year-specific factors involved in 
this. Lastly, given the composition of this sample, this is not guaranteed to hold in districts that 
have lower than 25 percent of poverty. Perhaps, a change in governing structure would make no 
difference in districts that differ from this sample.  
 The coefficient of wealth percentage is significant in the 2010 model, both with and 
without DC. The positive coefficient indicates a one point increase in the wealth percentage, 
translates into 20.6% greater private contributions per student. This supports the second part of 
the third hypothesis as outlined above. It was expected that the higher supply of funds in a 
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particular area would generate higher private contributions. Since wealth in the district serves as 
a measure of the potential funds in a particular area, this hypothesis is indeed supported.  
 Results from these models do not support the union hypothesis. There is a positive 
coefficient for union rank, indicating a trend of weaker unions with more money. However, the 
results are not significant. One possible explanation is that union strength does not matter for 
most donations to a district. Oftentimes the media depicts union opposition to measures such as 
teacher evaluation and changes to compensation. For these initiatives, often pushed for through 
the incentives of large philanthropic organization grants, union opposition may be an issue. 
However, if Santa Ana’s trends seem to indicate what philanthropic giving looks like nationally, 
then teachers unions may not oppose. As members are teachers themselves, it is likely they 
would welcome money used for field trips, instructional supplies, and extracurricular, as they are 
directly benefiting students in a positive way.  
 Another possibility for unions that was not accounted for here is how the union strength 
is dependent upon the city. I utilized a measure of union strength compiled for the state level and 
assigned all districts within the state the same measure. However, it is quite possible that the 
union’s ability to act is dependent on city factors. Unions in San Antonio might have different 
influence than in Dallas or Fort Worth. This differentiation is not captured in this analysis.  
 Enrolment size is also another independent variable without a significant coefficient. In 
the interviews conducted, as explained in the following sections of this study, many school 
district officials noted that they believed enrollment size to be an important consideration for 
donors. This sample was created for larger districts (40,000 students and above) as a means to 
test the effects of variables such as mayoral control. As long as a district meets a threshold of 
students, enrollment may no longer serve to explain the variation in funding levels. Also, there 
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can be economies of scale playing a role. Larger districts need more money overall, since they 
are providing instruction for more students. However, when implementing a large-scale initiative 
across a district, the cost per pupil is likely to decrease. Therefore, when raising funds, a district 
might not need as much per-pupil for larger scale initiatives. Further investigation into the uses 
of the money would be needed to validate these possibilities. 
 Lastly, it is unsurprising that the poverty percentage coefficient is insignificant. This 
sample was created largely to test the effects of mayoral control and union strength. However, 
there is selection bias in regards to poverty. Since all districts have a great percentage of poverty, 
it is unlikely that the percentage of poverty in these districts is an explanatory variable for the 
variation in private funds. Donors may indicate poverty as a reason for contributing to a school, 
however it is quite possible that once it reaches a certain threshold, the percentage does not 
change the behavior of donors.  
 
Table	  10:	  National	  Sample	  2010-­‐2011	  Dependent	  Variable	   Log	  (Private	  Contributions	  Per	  Student)	  
	   2010	   2011	  Enrollment	   -­‐.002	   -­‐.002	  	   (.002)	   (.002)	  Mayoral	  Control	   1.591*	   1.934*	  	   (.803)	   (.941)	  Union	  Rank	   .028	   .046	  	   (.024)	   (.028)	  Wealth	  Percentage	   .206*	   .075	  	   (.101)	   (.133)	  Poverty	  Percentage	   .090	   -­‐.069	  	   (.077)	   (.098)	  Constant	   -­‐2.722	   2.799	  	   (3.277)	   (4.017)	  N	   18	   18	  
*	  denotes	  significance	  at	  the	  10%	  level	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XII. Interview Methods 
 There are multiple reasons and theories that exist as to why there is variation in the 
amount of funding school districts across the country receive. Because private funding is brought 
into school districts from a variety of different sources, it is expected that different districts will 
see varying amounts. I have hypothesized that three variables can explain the differences in 
philanthropic and private funding that public school districts receive: 1. School board status 
(appointed vs. elected) 2. Union strength and 3. Funding Constraints  
 As mentioned above, I expected to see that districts in which mayors were given control 
and authority in selecting a superintendent or the board of education for a district would see 
higher levels of private and philanthropic funding when compared to school districts with boards 
elected by the population. Secondly, I hypothesized that strong unions would oppose many terms 
and conditions imposed by philanthropic funders, thus resulting in lower donation amounts in 
districts with strong unions. Lastly, I believed that funding constraints would impact the ability 
for districts to receive donations. On one hand, districts with high demand for funds, such as 
districts with high levels of poverty, should see these demands met by outside donors. On the 
other hand, districts in which there are higher levels of wealth, the supply of funds is greater and 
thus these districts should also obtain higher levels of private funding. 
There are a number of limitations of testing these hypotheses in quantitative data. The 
task of tracking money is rather difficult when there is not one standard that all districts must 
follow. Philanthropic contributions and grants are accounted for in the annual financial budgets, 
but the categorization can vary from district to district. Furthermore, a quantitative approach in 
measuring the different variables in the hypotheses can limit a complete, nuanced understanding 
of the issue. For instance, to understand the impact of mayoral control, it is important to learn the 
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ways in which the school board plays a role in the grants process rather than just the overall 
effect. The same logic applies to a qualitative approach to unpacking the strength of teachers 
unions. There are many quantitative measures that can serve as proxies but do not capture all of 
the intricacies of teacher involvement. Lastly, using interviews allows the emergence of other 
funding constraints. Although poverty levels are one measure of funding constraints, they are 
only one of the many financial barriers a school district must contend with.  
Consequentially, I decided to also examine my hypotheses using interviews. In order to 
investigate and test these particular hypotheses, I crafted a questionnaire of 12 questions to be 
administered to the 28 districts in the sample. (See Appendix F for Interview Questions) 
Questions were crafted particularly to address and uncover answers regarding the three 
hypotheses. Additionally, these questions were also used to gauge background and a greater 
understanding of the landscape of philanthropic giving.  
To test the impact of mayorally controlled districts, I utilized question 10 in particular: 
What is the role of the school board in the grant process (Do they advise in the seeking of 
grants/donations or just approve donations already made?). This question determines how the 
school board plays a role in the grant application. Essentially, this estimates the level to which 
school districts impact the work of other departments in finding donor and setting a tone for 
looking to outside sources. Given my hypothesis, I expect that districts with mayoral input will 
have school boards that play a more active role in the grant process and will set a tone to look for 
external funding. Outside funders push for reforms with the terms they stipulate in the grant, and 
their viewpoints can often match the views of the mayorally controlled district. Therefore, in 
these districts, appointed school boards can take a more active role in seeking outside funders as 
they should be more willing to implement the terms of private grants.  
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The second hypothesis, in uncovering how unions impact overall philanthropic funding, I 
asked questions 7 and 9. Question 7 asks about the typical grant process and what staff members 
are implicated, while question 9 asks about teacher approval needed for the terms of the grant. 
As stronger teachers unions often stand as a barrier against controversial reforms – many of 
which are included in grant stipulations – it is expected that the role of the teachers and their 
level of involvement in the process will impact the overall philanthropic funding level. Districts 
in which teachers have the opportunity to get involved can impede grant progress at many places 
along the grant development continuum – preventing the district from applying for a 
controversial grant or preventing a rewarded grant from being fully implemented in the district. 
In order to understand how financial constraints in the grant process, a combination of 
questions were written. Questions designed to discover how districts find grants and the types of 
grants they receive allow for districts to explain their grant process. By explaining their own 
systematic effort, districts can point to their reasoning in response to the particular conditions 
they face. It gives a deeper understand of how their work is directly tied to constraints they face 
– financial or otherwise. 
The rest of the questions, while not tied to a particular hypothesis, were designed to 
generate a more complete picture and understanding of the scope of philanthropic and private 
funding in the district. These questions also garner information on factors that influence the 
overall amount of philanthropic funds such as the way the district approaches the topic of private 
funding, the amount of effort the district puts in, the yield and return on their efforts, and other 
support systems they have put in place.  
After the interviews were underway, I added an additional question that was not related 
to a particular hypothesis. I asked district officials “Why District X? What characteristics of your 
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district, in particular, make it an attractive investment for private donors?” By asking this 
question, I was able to uncover other variables that are influence the variation seen in total 
philanthropic funding levels.  
 Following the creation of the questionnaire, I reached out to officials in the 28 districts in 
my national sample. After surveying the websites of various school districts, I found that the 
official best suited to answer the questionnaire varied based on the districts. The way in which 
districts structure their departments differed from district to district. Although most districts had 
an official with duties related to obtaining private grants/donations, the office in which it was 
held was not constant across districts. Officials were found in departments of finance, 
family/community engagement, and specific grants departments.  
 Once the particular official was identified, I emailed out an initial invitation for a phone 
interview. For districts that did not respond initially, I conducted phone call follow-ups. After 
explaining to the district about the research project, some districts transferred me to another 
official that was better suited to answer the work. In a few cases, this official was different than 
the person I initially intended to reach.  
 Conducting outreach to the districts in the sample resulted in responses from 16 of the 28 
districts. Of the 16 districts, I spoke to and interviewed 11 officials. The remaining 5 chose not to 
speak by phone, but did provide email response and additional information. Santa Ana, for 
instance, emailed answers to all questions in the questionnaire while the remaining districts gave 
information through an annual report or budget. 12 of the 28 districts did not respond to any of 
the outreach communication.  
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XIII. Interview Results 
After conducting the interviews, I gained a deeper understanding of how school districts 
went about securing funds from non-governmental sources. Speaking first hand with officials 
directly involved in grants work gave a more complete picture of the process. Although these 
findings are based on 11 phone interviews, the information gathered still points and suggests to 
factors that affect philanthropic giving across the country as well, even if exact details cannot be 
discerned from this particular sample. Commonalities amongst districts included the channel 
through which donors could contribute as well as a process for securing funds. Details on each of 
these do emerge between districts, resulting in factors that ultimately affect the overall funding 
each receives.  
 A majority of districts in the sample utilized an associated independent fund or 
foundation as a channel through which donations can be received. Officials from many districts 
indicated the 501 (c) (3) status as an important reason for the creation and existence of these 
foundations. Having an outlet that bears this tax status gives philanthropic funders and private 
donors the opportunity to donate to public education causes, while also earning a tax exemption.  
Donors also find the independent status of these associated foundations to be particularly 
attractive. Officials from different school boards noted that donors wanted to ensure their money 
would be properly managed and spent. This could be achieved more effectively, in donors’ 
minds, when leadership not affiliated with the school district had control over the funds. Even 
though the programs and terms of the grants implicated the school district both in the 
implementation and the effects of the money, the independent foundation serves to ease concerns. 
Not all districts did follow this particular model, with some districts themselves serving as the 
channel for private funds, however it did appear to be the most common.  
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 The grant process, in addition to the donation channel, also appeared to be very similar. 
Districts did differ in terms of the offices used to manage each step of the process. However the 
overall method of obtaining private funds stayed fairly consistent. Districts had to identify 
funding opportunities that existed, decide which grants to apply for, and write and submit a 
proposal. Once awarded funds, districts had to implement the projects and initiatives as outlined 
on the terms. Evaluation and research of the effectiveness typically followed suit, with 
communication of the results to both the funder and the rest of the district occurred at the last 
stage. I will refer to the overall process as the “grant continuum” which represents the stages 
from identification to final communication.  
 While the channel and process appeared to be similar across districts, I intended to 
uncover the variables that influenced disparities in levels of private funding and donations. No 
discernable effect arose of how the type of school board impacted the level of philanthropic 
funds. Even though questions were specifically asked to get an understanding of the active or 
passive role a school board might play in the process, there was no difference between districts 
with mayorally controlled and appointed boards and those school boards that hade been elected.  
 Baltimore, Boston, and Philadelphia were three of the mayorally controlled districts. 
Representatives from each of these districts commented on the level of involvement in the school 
board. In Baltimore, the school board did not take an active role in the process. The Grants 
Development Manager of Baltimore was largely free to manage the work that she did, with little 
oversight and authority from the school board of CEO. She noted that the board “set the six 
principles of the Baltimore City School district,” and she worked to align her work with those 
goals.93 However, ultimately her work was largely shielded from aggressive efforts on behalf of 
an appointed board.  Philadelphia’s Grant Development manager indicated an even lesser role for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Baltimore Official, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, Philadelphia, PA, February 6, 2014. 
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the School Reform Commission (Philadelphia’s name for its school board). The SRC approves 
all small grants (under $20,000) in one resolution quarterly, while approving large grants (greater 
than $25,000) on an individual basis. Her work otherwise is not directly impacted by the 
direction and management of the SRC.94 Boston also noticed how school board members served 
in a passive manner in regards to private funding. The board intended to be informed of activity 
on this front, but did not actively pursue or manage the work.95   
  Districts with elected school boards also commented on their school boards in a similar 
manner. In many districts ranging from Santa Ana, Aldine, and Long Beach, the board’s primary 
function in relation to this work is to approve grants, gifts, and donations received by the districts. 
The boards are interested in the operation of their school district and thus seek to be informed at 
meetings. Officials from the grant office in Aldine appear at board meeting monthly to update 
grant progress in the district.96 Similar activities occur in other districts, most often in the form of 
a monthly or quarterly report to the board.  
 Officials in Fresno and Santa Ana – districts with elected school boards – also shared 
how the board can set priorities that set the premise for the overall work they do. This model is 
akin to Baltimore in which the board broadly sets a vision for the district, emphasizing that all 
work in the district should center on providing the best education for children.  
 In both El Paso and Milwaukee, the level of involvement is slightly increased over others. 
A board of directors runs the associated foundations in both districts. Seats on this particular 
board are reserved for one to two school board members. The remaining members of the board, 
however, are not affiliated with the school district in a formal manner. Officials from these 
districts noted the primary purpose of reserving seats in the foundation for school board members 
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was to provide a proper channel of communication between district and foundation. This ensured 
coordination of the efforts to make sure districts’ goals and priorities were met. Milwaukee’s 
official noted “the board takes a more strategic and functional status, while the [district] 
administration brings ideas.”97 It is important from an advisory perspective to have their input, 
but the large efforts are coordinated by the foundation.  
 From the responses of these officials, it appears as if appointed boards are not overly 
influential in the successes of these districts to raise external funds.  Even though it is plausible 
that appointed boards have the potential to be reform-minded and therefore could align their 
views with philanthropic funders, it does not appear that they are playing a substantial role in the 
grant process of these particular districts. Although the boards impact the work that occurs on the 
entire district, they do not appear to be an influential determinant in the level of funding they 
receive. In districts with elected board members, mixed interaction between the board and the 
foundation or grant office points to the notion that the board is not a major determinant in the 
variation of funding the district brings in annually.  
 A similar narrative appears for the role of teachers in the grant making process. A clear 
conclusion on whether union strength influences the philanthropic funding of the district does 
not emerge. District officials noted that teachers are interested in the work of the grant 
development work because of the potential gains. El Paso’s associated foundation primarily 
works by providing “Classroom Improvement Grants” awarded by a surprise crew annually.98 
Teachers benefit from these grants as they can receive technology and curricular materials to 
bolster their lessons. Other than being recipients of the grants, teachers are absent from the grant 
development process in Milwaukee. El Paso mentioned annual employee giving drive, in which 
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school district employees could donate to their foundation. This was the only involvement of the 
teachers in the work of the foundation to bring in non-governmental funds to provide education 
for the students of El Paso. In Milwaukee, teachers benefit from the work of the foundation but 
are an absent stakeholder in the attainment of funds. Milwaukee’s foundation provides “Learning 
Journeys” to teachers. As the official notes, these are “field trips on steroids. Basically, teachers 
are given curricular materials before the journey, provided admission and transportation to the 
journey itself, and receive additional supports to finish their journey back in the classroom.”99 
Teachers benefit from the grant development efforts but are not involved otherwise.   
 In Chicago, the approach of the associated fund in their utilization of private money also 
serves to benefit teachers. An official noted that they “value talent and teachers, taking an 
educator led approach rather than a top down approach.”100 By utilizing focus groups with 
educators from Chicago Public Schools, the work and projects coming from the fund aim to 
benefit teachers and principals. Chicago’s Public Education Fund even gave one million dollars 
to the Chicago Teacher’s Union for national board certification. Bringing in the teacher voice, 
allows teachers become a stakeholder in the work associated with private funds rather than a 
force with which the district must contend.  
 Many district officials noted potential difficulties could arise from funding if the intended 
recipient, particularly teachers, did not want it. Most private funding has terms or conditions 
applied, through a particular program or initiative that needs to be implemented. Boston’s 
official indicated that this is the stage where they often run into problems. Although they can be 
successful at raising the money, teachers might not want to get the money when they have to 
follow a particular protocol. Rather than stopping the fund from pursuing more donors, the 
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official aimed to increase communication so all parties involved knew their expectations. 
Cleveland’s officials also spoke about the terms of grants. He said that they would “never accept 
the grant if the terms are onerous,” therefore only pursuing grants the district would implement. 
101 His comment points to unions having potential influence on the process, as they could 
indicate what they could consider onerous. However, the point in the overall continuum of where 
they exert influence is different than hypothesized. Based on his comments, the voice of the 
teachers union could impact how they identify grants to apply for, rather than serving as a barrier 
against terms of grants awarded.  
 Overall, it appears there is mixed reaction on behalf of the teachers, but there has not 
been evidence pointing to strong union reaction against philanthropic funding. Therefore, based 
on the interviews, it is inconclusive as to exactly how much unions impact the variation and 
success of bringing in private money in the school districts.  
 In regards to the third hypothesis, funding constraints did appear to be influential in the 
grant process but did not solely explain the differences in success rates of obtaining funds. 
Constraints were important in how districts approached their development work. Many districts 
noted overall decreases in school budgets, thus pushing districts toward non-governmental 
sources. San Antonio cited Texas budget cuts combined with decreasing federal and state grant 
opportunities as a reason to pursue private grants.102 An official in Baltimore also indicated 
similar concerns of not having enough money to provide quality education. Baltimore was  
“forced into ” of obtaining private money.103  
Even though it appears as if budget cuts are a financial constraint that has an effect on the 
work of philanthropic development, it is not clear to the degree to which it affects the overall 
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successes of the districts. Districts clearly indicated that budget cuts influenced a district to 
pursue grant development. However, officials did not comment on the exact percentage of the 
budget cuts—an amount differing by state. Consequently, districts responded differently to the 
overall budget crises. Different approaches to similar problems can still lead to wide diversity in 
the overall private funding levels of each district. Therefore, a clear relationship between the 
funding constraint of a budget cut and the amount raised is not fully apparent. Many factors 
along the grant continuum process also contribute to the final outcome.  
Poverty levels also appear to affect philanthropic foundations’ decisions to donate to a 
school district. When asked specifically what made their district attractive to funders, officials 
most often pointed to the high levels of poverty in their district. Philadelphia and Memphis both 
emphasized this as they believed philanthropic and private donations were mainly donating 
money to help the population in their district. As poverty is linked with lower reading levels, 
higher drop out rates, and other affiliated problems, it becomes a financial burden for the district. 
With such high levels of students living in poverty, philanthropic foundations see a worthwhile 
cause in giving to these districts. Despite being an important factor, once again it is not 
thoroughly explanatory of the differences in private funds. For example, El Paso and Boston 
have two vastly different results in the amount of funds received from non-governmental sources. 
El Paso, a district with 33.6 percent poverty, raised slightly over 1 million dollars from private 
sources over the 20 years in the foundations existence. Boston, on the other hand, has a poverty 
rate of 28.9 percent. Annually, the district raises from 10 to 14 million dollars from private 
sources. While this example does not eliminate poverty as a factor, it does illustrate there are 
indeed other variables at play.  
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XIV. Additional Interview Findings 
 From the above findings, it is evident that the variables of the initial hypotheses have 
some bearing on the overall outcome – total philanthropic funds received. However, based on the 
interviews the effects are neither fully discernable nor are they the only effects involved.  Based 
on findings, private funding success is dependent upon the vision and mission of the school 
district, the competency of the individual in charge of grants development, and the capacity of 
the school district.  
As mentioned previously, the school board plays some role in the philanthropic funding 
process. Although there wasn’t a systematic difference between appointed and elected boards, 
the interviews suggested that the board in the district implicitly affects the work done to attract 
donations from the private sector. The overall mission and vision of the district impacts all 
offices within and associated with the district. School boards retain interest in providing quality 
education for all students that are served. In keeping this overarching theme in mind, they often 
come up with principles and missions to guide their work.  
Departments that work on institutional development from the private sector must work 
with this framework in mind. Mentioned previously, Baltimore works to ensure alignment with 
the school board’s values for the district. Furthermore, Baltimore notes that the work also 
responds to values set forth by the school district’s CEO or superintendent. According to an 
official, the “former school district CEO valued innovation for innovation’s sake.”104 
Consequently, the work in various departments attempts to match this overarching theme. The 
realm of philanthropic funding often involves innovation, thus there exists an underlying 
connection between institutional development from private sources and the school leadership 
team. 
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Other districts follow suit, with reform minded practices pervading the entire district. 
This mindset affects both the work on the district side and from the philanthropic organizations’ 
perspective as well. Even if direct pressure and management do not stem from the school 
leadership and board, the pervading ideology of reform and innovation allows for different 
funding opportunities for the district to pursue. Memphis, for instance, is willing to reform and 
change practices to do whatever is needed.105 Therefore, Memphis is attractive in the process 
when like-minded donors make final decisions. Donors will invite districts like Memphis, 
increasing the odds of being awarded external funds. Cleveland also carries a reform-minded 
agenda through its comprehensive Cleveland Plan, aiming to revitalize the entire city through a 
transformation of the school system.106 With this plan, the work of the grants office is aligned 
with the district goals of reform.  
Whereas certain districts have reform-minded priorities as expressed in their visions, 
other districts do not hold the same beliefs. As a result, the work in the realm of philanthropic 
funding is slightly altered when compared with districts such as Cleveland and Memphis. 
Districts such as San Antonio, Aldine, and Fresno expressed that their districts were not actively 
trying to implement reforms such as implementing a teacher evaluation system and changing 
staff compensation. While they could not pinpoint exact reasons or oppositions to these reforms, 
they noted that it was not part of the mission of the school district. Hence, when pursuing 
funding opportunities, reform initiatives were not sought after in these particular districts. From 
these examples, it is apparent that vision and mission are key components that influence both 
offices within the district and associated foundations. 
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While the overall vision and mission of the district affected development work, the 
competency of the individual most directly involved in private fundraising efforts was also 
important. After speaking with districts involved in the work, it became clear that the individual 
in the position mattered greatly. The individual’s experiences, skillset, and approach to the work 
impacted the amount of funding that districts brought in.  
Some districts and foundations had leaders working on grant development that were fully 
committed and devoted to doing the work. In Philadelphia, where state budget cuts have 
impacted the district for multiple years, officials know that philanthropic funds are one way to 
make up the ground. Carrying this particular mindset, the official sets the vision for the 
employees she oversees that carry out the grant writing, applications and implementation. 
Although district mission is important in reaching various offices, it is essential that the person in 
charge see their work in a similar light. Coordinating these efforts is often dependent upon how 
the individual sets the tone for either the grants development office or the associated foundation. 
By working together, Philadelphia’s grant office is able to take the tone of the district and 
strategically apply to private grants in a successful manner.  
 Leaders in Memphis’ foundations also have a dedicated mindset to do “whatever it takes” 
to bring in extra funding. Officials at SchoolSeed, the associated foundation formerly known as 
Memphis City Schools Foundation, coordinate efforts with community partners.107 They know 
that the leadership has to set the tone in engaging in meaningful relationships, to ensure success 
in total donation levels. An official in Chicago also noted how the individuals of the board at the 
Fund for Public Education were an important consideration for outside donors. The backgrounds 
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and companies that the board members worked for served as a positive signal to donors who 
trusted these board members to spend the money effectively and efficiently.108  
 Growing the office and grant efforts can also stem from ideas emerging from individual 
leaders. In Boston, the leader in grant development work came into the office two years ago and 
completely transformed the approach and attitude of the entire office. Instead of scrambling 
together to file an application within a few short weeks, he led efforts to coordinate pre-
assembled programs that could be used for a grant application. By planning initiatives ahead of 
time, Boston focused on grants that best matched their needs. The work of the grants office and 
associated foundation changed in response to new leadership. Therefore, the leadership style and 
associated ideas of a particular individual can have drastic overall effects.  
 Not all individuals who maintain leadership positions in grant development carry a 
similar attitude to their work. It is possible in that they are just carrying out the vision set forth by 
the district they are in, but at the same time are not aggressively pushing for extra growth and 
change within their particular environment. In Fresno for instance, the official came into the role 
two years ago and views her job as “maintaining the status quo” of the office.109 Although there 
are potential constraints in the Fresno environment to why growth might be limited in terms of 
looking for external funders, the official did not have a strategic outlook to identify and plan for 
new funding sources. Growth appeared not to be a priority for this particular district, resulting in 
lesser private funds.  
 In El Paso, the individual leader also proved to be important in bringing attention to 
private funding when it had been neglected for so long. The official I spoke to came into the 
leadership position of the foundation four years prior, as it had been sitting vacant. This official 
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originally was a parent volunteer who became interested in the work that El Paso was doing and 
noted the need for extra funding. Her motivations got her into the work and provided El Paso’s 
foundation with leadership that had a vested interest.110 Even though the absence of a leader 
speaks to larger issues with the efforts in raising private funds, the individual who stepped up 
changed the trajectory.  
Milwaukee’s story also points to how an individual in a position can change the work 
being carried out. The official came into the role from a fundraising background. As a result, she 
had made connections with local businesses and foundations in the community. When arriving in 
her new position at Milwaukee Public Schools Foundation she had already built a professional 
network from her prior work. Utilizing these connections allowed her to ease her way into the 
position and find more money to do things such as backpack and clothing drives for student 
across the district.111 In Cleveland, the official also came from the non-profit sector into the role 
at the school district.112 Having the expertise of this field and prior connections allowed for a 
more effective leader to do the work to obtain private funding.  
Individuals, as seen from the multitude of cases, have a tremendous role in how the 
district does at bringing in money from private sources. Whether it the mindset and leadership 
skills they bring or the past connections and experience, attributes of the leader are influential in 
explaining variation.  Leaders who utilize their connections and experiences, take an aggressive 
approach, and operate efficiently yield greater amounts of private donations to the district.  As 
with any variable, the individual’s characteristics do not completely serve to explain why certain 
districts like Boston and Memphis can raise much larger sums of money than Fresno and Aldine. 
However, the interviews indicate that individual agency influences the work being done and the 
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overall result of the efforts.  School districts have practical implications stemming from this 
finding. When making hiring decisions, school districts must carefully evaluate how the 
individual will impact the bottom line of private donations.  
In addition to individual agency and the vision of the district, the overall success of 
obtaining private money is also dependent on the capacity of the district. As mentioned earlier, 
the grant continuum consists of multiple stages in the ultimate process. From initial identification 
of opportunities, to the end communication with the funders about the successes of the program, 
there are many points in the process that implicate different members. Consequently, each step 
along the continuum is influential in the overall goal of obtaining member. Outlined in the below 
graphic are the five major steps involved in this process.  
 
Figure 1: Stages of the Grant Continuum 
 The capacity of the district impacts the approach to each step along the continuum. One 
factor influencing the overall work of raising money is the availability of money itself. In a time 
marked by the recession, state budget cuts, and a governmental shutdown, funds are limited 
overall. Districts and foundations require dedicated staff members to actively pursue, apply for, 
and implement philanthropic grants. When their overall budget has decreased, districts often 
make personnel sacrifices in order to continue to provide educational services. These cuts force 
districts to substitute away from traditional sources of funding like governmental funds to private 
sources. Responding to the same incentives, the district also cuts staffing for the private funds. 
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Budget cuts both increase the need for outside funding and decrease the district’s capacity to do 
so.  
 Philadelphia had indicated that the staff in charge of finding the grants, writing them, 
coordinating programs, and other associated duties have decreased from four to six members. In 
Milwaukee, a staff member can only devote time on weekends to foundational work as they are 
understaffed in other departments. Baltimore also indicated the downsize effect on the 
development office, increasing each staff member’s work dramatically. In these cases, funding 
has hampered the ability to put devoted members to staffing.  With less staff involved in 
obtaining funding that is more variable to receive, district staff operations become increasingly 
important.  
 While the overall grant continuum is limited in capacity based on budget cuts and staffing, 
internal capacity plays a role in each individual stage of the grant continuum. How the district is 
structured and the operations set in place help determine the overall outcome. In the initial stage 
of identification, the district has to adopt strategies that will maximize the effectiveness. In 
identifying grant opportunities, districts often have to weigh the cost of producing an application 
with the expected benefit of return on investment.  
 Philadelphia has increased its capacity by utilizing a grant committee consisting of the 
deputy superintendent and other officials. After the grant office identifies potential funding 
opportunities, the opportunity goes under review by the committee. They decide whether this is a 
grant they would like to pursue, evaluate extra costs associated with implementing the grant 
(security, lighting, building maintenance, etc.) and their chances of winning. By pre-vetting the 
grant from the initial stage, Philadelphia has increased its capacity to be most successful. Rather 
69 
than a broad based approach in applying to every private grant, they strategically identify the 
best grants to maximize chances of success.  
 In Boston, new efforts have been made to maximize chances through an identification 
process that matches their priorities. As outlined earlier, Boston pre-plans programs that they 
believe would be most effective. The official called it a “toolbox of programs they could call 
upon,” so they are prepared when opportunities exist.113 Many officials noted the quick timeline 
of a grant application; oftentimes only three to four weeks between identification and deadline. 
Therefore, Boston strategically enhances its capacity to identify potential grants that would be 
best fits for Boston.  
 Once reaching the application phase, districts also differ in their capacity to fulfill all 
necessary parts. A quick turnaround, excessive amounts of documents, and multiple staff 
members were all concerns raised by officials about the application stage. Because there are 
many logistics involved, processes and communications district adopt impact the process. The 
completion of the application differs from district to district. Some complete the entire 
application in-house, utilizing district offices to come together to produce an application. 
Baltimore and Philadelphia are two such districts. On the other hand, it is often left up to either 
the foundation or an external office. The foundation in Memphis noted their control of the entire 
grant process, thus they are the ones to actually fill the application out. In Cleveland, they 
identify the grants and potential funding opportunities, but an external grant writer controls such 
a process. 
 Once grants are awarded, districts have to successfully implement the terms of the grant 
in order to receive more funding for the future. Therefore, just receiving one grant does not 
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automatically entitle the district to future private funding. The district has to use it wisely. The 
capacity of the district to do so is heavily dependent on communication between offices of the 
district. Additionally, capacity to implement is also dependent on relationships and 
communications between the district and their foundation as well as the district and external 
partners.  
 Baltimore often receives grants that are dependent on utilizing resources from external 
partners such as Teach For America, the New Teacher Project, and New Leaders. Thus, to 
implement effectively, Baltimore identifies a plan of how the external organizations are going to 
be involved in accordance with the district’s priorities and goals.114 Information is shared 
through collaborative meetings with all associated parties to ensure funds get used in accordance 
with the terms of the grant. The official in Chicago also noted how effective communication and 
collaboration with all parties leads to proper implementation. By reaching out to the district 
through monthly meetings, and gaining insight with educators in the city, funds are implemented 
in a beneficial manner to all parties involved. Thus, proper implementation can be part of a 
positive feedback cycle leading to more money obtained.  
While these districts see success, obstacles of implementing the funds can and do occur 
in districts. Boston notes the need to change the culture in the district, as many do not want to 
receive the funding and actually implement it. As many district officials noted, there are many 
terms to the grant that specify how the money can be spent and what programs must be put in 
place with the money. When offices within the district are given funds, some may not want to do 
all the necessary work involved with receiving private money. Many officials noted that the rush 
of the application process led to faulty implementation. With efforts focused on getting the 
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application done, clear expectations and roles are not delineated from the beginning, which can 
lead to confusion later on.  
It is not just the gatekeeper at the helm of the grants office that must yield the capacity to 
run an effective and strategic operation to identify opportunities. All parts of the district are 
implicated in the work at the implementation stage. Coordination and communication are 
necessary to combine efforts to use the funds according to terms and conditions outlined by 
funders.  
Just implementing and following the terms of the grant is not enough for districts. In 
addition to coordinating among different offices to provide programs as outlined in the terms, 
districts also must evaluate their programs. Donors desire to understand the efficacy of their 
money – if it is being put in good hands, being put to good use, and helping students learn and 
achieve. Officials noted that successful outcomes bolster the image of the district and make it 
more attractive to future donors. However, in order to show their successes, districts have to 
evaluate the programs that they bring to the district. Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore all 
noted partnerships with research universities. They noted that these relationships with local 
universities allow for systematic evaluations and research about the programs. Other districts, 
such as Fresno and Memphis, indicated a research and evaluation team was in house. Specific 
offices in the district oversee programs, collect data, and report back to the grant office about 
successes. With this information, grant donors are able to see what types of programs they 
should continue to fund in the future and what districts will utilize the funds the best.  
As with other aspects of the process, districts vary in this capacity to actually implement 
this work. Resources in Milwaukee and El Paso are unavailable. They have anecdotal evidence 
about the success of their classroom, but lack a formal investigation using quantitative data. 
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Teachers in these districts appear to be happy receiving classroom scholarships and support for 
field trips, but there is no empirical data indicating the benefits to potential donors. While this 
does not exclude these districts from receiving philanthropic donations, many large foundations 
will overlook such districts with little evidence involved.  
Lastly, internal capacity in regards to communication about the programs and the use of 
funds is essential. Districts, in order to receive continued funding, need to maintain relationships 
with their funders. Many districts noted the importance of continuing to strengthen current 
relationships by reporting on successes and stressing what other needs could be met with further 
funding. In some cases, this reporting is built into the contract. Memphis noted that there are 
certain benchmarks that must be relayed back to the donor in order for the next phase of money 
to be released to the district. Memphis and Cleveland noted that these check-ins, reports, and 
presentations were the core of the work. It allowed them to showcase to donors that the district 
had the coordination and communication necessary to utilize funds for the benefits of the 
students. It signals trust to donors that they would be wise to award these districts money 
because these districts can produce outcomes. 
Communication opportunities allow donors transparency to see work carried out in the 
district. Not all the districts utilize these connections to the best of their abilities. Based on the 
structure of the district, Baltimore and Philadelphia leave donor relationships up to the associated 
foundation. By only focusing on the application and implementation, they add another link in the 
chain of communication. While these districts appear successful in bringing in outside funding, 
this adds to the likelihood of potential problems in the course. Other districts realize this is an 
area of growth. In Boston, there is little communication about the programs to the original donor. 
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Thus by not emphasizing this, the district’s capacity is weakened to obtain further private 
donations.  
At each stage, the district needs internal capacity to carry out the process most effectively. 
The steps of the continuum are important for how districts interact with donors, how they utilize 
the funds awarded, and how they go about receiving future funds. Districts have control of many 
issues that limit capacity. Districts can determine capacity through building and maintaining 
relationships with external partners, hiring competent staffers, and creating effective 
communication systems. All of these, within their locus of control, aid in their pursuit of external 
funds. Despite this, the district also faces numerous external factors impacting their abilities.  
A common thread throughout the interviews was reliance on local partners. Districts 
received a large proportion of funds from local community organizations and local companies. 
Officials noted that many funders wanted to keep their money locally, in order to see the benefits 
on the community in which they were located. Many donors know that education is linked with 
the success of the city, thus they support efforts aimed at preparing the students in the local 
context. By doing so, many hope to increase the skills of the workforce and keep students within 
the community post-graduation.  
Heavy reliance on local partners can be either a blessing or disguise for the district. 
Depending on where a district is situated, there can be differences in both the size and number of 
local companies and partners. In turn, with dependence on local partners, the amount of available 
funds to a district can vary greatly. Regardless of district operations, they have to deal with 
external factors from these entities.  
Despite having the same needs as other districts, El Paso and Fresno are located in cities 
without many corporations. They receive funding from companies like AT&T and Kaiser 
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Permanente, but the pool of opportunities is limited. Smaller cities do not have the same level of 
business, resulting in fewer opportunities for partnerships, and ultimately less revenue. Even 
though a local tie appears to be an important factor in philanthropic funding, districts can be 
limited if there is not a strong business sector. Boston also experiences limitations in capacity to 
raise funds based on the surrounding landscape. The official in Boston pointed out that there 
were 1,000 nonprofit agencies in the city. Consequently, when businesses and foundations 
offered grants, Boston Public Schools had extra competition from the surrounding community. 
In other cases, the surrounding community augments capacity of the district. Numerous 
companies or large corporations can increase the amount of available funding for education. 
Aldine highlighted the importance of oil companies Chevron and Exxon. With their close 
proximity in Houston, they have a vested interest in the student population and have funded 
major STEM initiatives. Philadelphia also sees similar successes with the local corporation, 
Comcast. With a strong business community, the capacity is only increased as the possibility of 
partnership increases. Community partners in the Baltimore area also serve to support Baltimore 
City School’s ability to drive home private funding. Organizations such Baltimore Arts and New 
Leaders have attracted the attention of donors. Since these organizations partner with Baltimore 
City Schools to create citywide initiatives, donors are more willing to fund grant requests from 
Baltimore City Schools. The surrounding community can serve to bolster the likelihood of a 
district being awarded private contributions.  
External perception of the school district also affects capability of the district. Whereas 
location of the school district can impact the district’s abilities independently of district 
operations, perceptions can indeed be linked. During the decision process, donors’ decisions 
might be influenced by their perceptions of districts. Donor opinions of the school district can 
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also influence the process at the first stages. If donors see districts receiving other awards from 
federal sources, it can serve as a signal to donate to these districts. Whether or not this is an 
accurate understanding of how the district operates, it affects what district’s donors send 
invitations to. Baltimore, for instance, was a finalist for Race to the Top District, a federal grant 
competition. Although it did not win the contest, Baltimore noted that this success had increased 
the Baltimore’s image in the philanthropic community. Consequently, many large foundations 
superficially invited Baltimore to apply for grants. Other districts also noticed that opinions of 
the districts, whether grounded in actual practices or not, played an important role in the decision 
process.  
From the interviews, it is apparent that there are many variables influencing the entire 
process. While there are dedicated members in each district involved in this process, private 
funding is an issue that is much more expansive. Each district’s success is dependent on a 
combination of factors ranging from the operations and leaderships of the district to the local 
context in which the district serves. Despite the numerous factors involved, common trends do 
arise amongst districts across the county. A clear vision of the district coupled with competent 
leadership and strong capacity of the district can help yield philanthropic funds for a school 
district. Because these are not quantitatively measured, the extent to which each piece 
contributes to the final product remains indiscernible. However, it is evident after speaking to 
many officials that these factors that influence how much money a district can raise from 
external sources.  
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XV. Connection to Public Administration 
The grant continuum and district success outlined above can be viewed in the framework 
of implementation theory. This field of research grew out of studies aimed to evaluate public 
policy. Many studies deemed social policies ineffective if they did not produce the desired 
outcome.115 However, many scholars noted that these evaluations potentially missed the true 
causal mechanism. Rather than being a result of an ineffective policy, the program potentially 
could not have been implemented the way it was intended. Early researchers in this field picked 
up on other factors leading to an ineffective outcome, rather than the policy itself. Murphy, for 
example, notes in his examination of Title I that the policy implementations success varied due 
to political and bureaucratic obstacles in each district. Looking at these additional factors that 
affect overall implementation highlights similarities with the grant continuum process. We 
cannot deem outright whether grant seeking is wholly effective or not, but rather understand the 
mechanisms along the way that influence the end result.  
Søren Winter’s Integrated Implementation model is useful in discerning the types of 
variables that are important in the analysis. The figure below is a model of his framework. Three 
broad categories must be examined: policy formulation, implementation process, and the 
implementation results. In the case of philanthropic giving in these school districts, there is no 
one particular policy being implemented. It is important to note that this differs from the 
implementation of the grant continuum as mentioned previously. The implementation phase 
above refers to specific programs from the terms and stipulations. Instead, in this framework, we 
must view the overall grant seeking process as the program that is implemented in the district. 
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From this, we can then examine the processes and factors contributing to the overall success- 
whether districts receive donations or not. 
 
 
Figure 2: The Integrated Implementation Model116 
 
 
 At the policy formulation stage, this grant seeking process is slightly different than an 
introduction of a social program resulting from public policy. Currently, revenues from state, 
federal and local sources is used to fund educational services in districts. Outside funds, however, 
are up to the discretion of the individual district. Thus, the process of grant seeking is not a 
mandated policy that is being implemented, but rather more akin to a response to conditions, 
namely budget cuts and economic downturns. Despite this difference, many features of this 
theory at this stage remain applicable.  
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 Policy formulation is often the result of conflicting interests when multiple actors 
involved. The conditions leading to the need for external funding, result directly from competing 
parties. Budgets at the state legislative level involve tradeoffs between different programs and 
sectors of society. As evidenced by the interviews, many state budgets cut funding for education, 
putting districts in a position to look for external funders. Examining “seeking grants and private 
contributions” as the “policy” districts must pursue is indeed plausible, as this is the course of 
action all the districts have taken.  The characteristics of such policies impact its ability to be 
implemented properly. Koski and May indicates that policy design with “lack of goal clarity or 
inconsistency in goals” along with “multiple actors and decision points” leads to less effective 
implementation.117  
Because there is no clear outline of where and how districts need to go about obtaining private 
funding, districts are limited in their successes from the start. Additionally, districts often 
coordinate this work between the various offices of the districts. Therefore, the very nature of 
what districts are tasked to do makes it difficult to implement effectively.  
 The implementation process itself is dependent on the organizations implicated in the 
work. Depending on the number of involved entities, the implementation can vary in its 
efficiency. Although some policy implementation occurs from one office, the scope of 
interorganizational connections providing policy programs has grown tremendously over the 
years. Specifically, there has been a growing trend between public agencies and either non-profit 
organizations or for-profit companies—the same interorganizational relationship seen in 
philanthropic giving to school districts.118  As a result, the partnerships can be beneficial. 
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Districts need to supplement the funds and non-profit foundations and companies can serve to 
fulfill this need. However, the district does not necessarily act as one agency but is filled with 
multiple actors in various departments and offices.  
More likely than not, when multiple organizations must coordinate efforts, “impediments 
to concerted action are greater and inducements to work together are typically fewer.”119 It is not 
an impossible task, but it does prove to be challenging. The trend for many districts to use 
associated foundations and non-profits to do development work is a result of the tax code. 
However, involving another organization in the process can also be an obstacle for districts as 
well. Although many districts take this route because of donor preferences and the lack of staff 
and management in-house, Rainey notes that “public administration in such settings calls for 
great skill, effort, and capacity.”120 Districts may think that it is beneficial to branch out and 
include others, but it can require more effort. The actual experiences of the district indicate that 
these theories have realistic implications. Different methods of the grant attainment process 
illustrate the challenges in having different actors work together to bring in private contributions.  
Although these challenges are inherent to processes with interorganizational relationships, 
there are methods to overcome these challenges. This is known as the Pressman-Wildavsky 
paradox. Pressman and Wildavsky believe that joint action remains an impediment to success in 
all implementation scenarios.121 However, theorists indicate “agreement on basic understandings 
at the outset of an implementation process can increase the odds of further agreement later.”122 
School districts have exhibited their methods at mitigating potential problems by setting up 
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meetings and deadlines for communication reports. The variation in how districts build support 
and coordination can factor into the disparities in the amount of funds received.  
Referring back to Winter’s model, the skills/interests of “street-level bureaucrats” also 
factor into the implementation of the policy. Street level bureaucrats are public service workers 
with direct interaction in their work and substantial discretion of execution.123 Lipsky, a 
prominent scholar in this field, notes that these bureaucrats have direct contact with the 
beneficiaries of the public services. Therefore, in the realm of philanthropic donations to districts, 
the district offices and schools are the direct beneficiaries of the private donations. As a result, 
the street-level bureaucrat would be the director of either the grants office or the associated 
school foundation. They have management above them in the form of a school system CEO or 
superintendent.  
Many scholars note that the street-level bureaucrats remain autonomous and serve as 
gatekeepers in how public policy is actually carried out. Lipsky writes that they “not only deliver 
but actively shape policy outcomes by interpreting rules and allocating scarce resources.”124 
Traditional hierarchical systems and management may provide direction but do not ultimately 
have the same impact on the overall goals. This is in accordance with the findings from the 
districts – foundation and grant development leaders remained largely autonomous in how they 
went about searching and applying for private funding. Furthermore, these officials were the 
ones who coordinated efforts with the recipients of the funds. The CEOs and superintendents, in 
many cases, served in supervising roles without much active oversight.  
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 Scholars also contend that the individual characteristics of the street-level bureaucrat are 
indeed important.  Rather than the oversight and direction of manners, it is the individual 
interests and professional norms that impact the work of those on the front-line. Furthermore, 
Sandfort described that often people were resistant to new policy initiatives. If these changes 
were in line with their view on professionalism and policy, then they were more likely to carry 
out the changes.125 If not, they continued to abide by their own beliefs. These theories, once 
again, are consistent with the findings from the school district. As mentioned earlier, the grants 
director or other type of leader in charge of the work serves as a gatekeeper. Their approach to 
the job, the vision they set for their work, and their alignment with the goals of the district affect 
the overall success.  
 It is evident that the experiences of districts in obtaining funding fit in the Integrated 
Implementation Model. The success of the school district is hampered from the start by the 
unclear situation. It is evident that more funding is needed but no clear guidelines are set for the 
districts. Thus, districts employ a unique approach, which also contributes to the ultimate 
outcome. In the school district scenario, it is namely the interorganizational aspects along with 
the competencies of the bureaucrats that determine success. Theories from implementation and 
public administration can serve to inform the school districts in the future. From talking with the 
district officials, it appears as if this trend towards utilizing private funding is not going away 
anytime soon. Thus, school districts must learn the best methods in order to get the resources 
needed to provide the best education for their students.  
 I argue that the best practices districts should adopt encompass efficiency and 
communication. From the interviews, these were areas where districts most often ran into 
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obstacles that prevented them from reaching their maximum potential. Assuming districts have 
hired competent leaders and set a vision for engaging in development work, I propose that 
districts engage in backwards planning. By highlighting a desired outcome, districts can identify 
the exact steps to reach the goal. It brings clarity to the process as all offices and employees 
know which part of the process they are responsible for and the dates at which they need to 
complete the tasks. The district has already accounted for the offices in charge of implementing 
the program, the research and evaluation and the communication with the donor. Mandatory 
meetings and check-ins can create transparency, so there are no surprises along the way. This 
planning process can be utilized for long-term district strategy (e.g. The Cleveland Plan) or for a 
grant-by-grant basis. In doing so, the district move away from reactive practices to a beneficial 
proactive process.  
 
XVI. California Methods 
 The national sample used in both the quantitative and the interview analysis was created 
primarily to test the first two hypotheses. Because high poverty was a selection criterion, the 
sample was inadequate to test the third hypothesis. Data obtained from California districts 
present a unique opportunity to determine the effect of financial constraints on private 
contributions.  
 School districts and other local education agencies in California are given a general-
purpose fund that is funded up until “revenue limit.”126 This fund consists of local property taxes 
and state general aid. If local property taxes exceed this threshold in a particular district, then the 
district is known as “basic aid” and only operates from local funding.127 Therefore districts that 
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have high property values can receive more money per pupil if the property tax revenue exceeds 
the revenue limit. At the same time, Proposition 13 limited the amount that property taxes could 
increase annually. Property taxes could only increase by two percent, thus capping revenue used 
by school district. 
 California’s districts are largely funded by property taxes – a source of revenue that has 
imposed limitations. These California-specific constraints make it an interesting case for within-
state analysis. By focusing within a particular state, factors that are specific to a state are 
controlled for as all districts in California abide by the same funding standards. Investigating 
California specifically determines whether the funding constraint in terms of property taxes  
 The dependent variable in this analysis is the amount of private contributions per student. 
Instead of using the 990 forms, this measure was obtained from the Annual Financial Data 
compiled by the California Department of Education. Specifically the data for this analysis is 
gathered from the 2010-2011 Standardized Account Code Structure Unaudited Actual Data.128 In 
this dataset, three particular funds accounted for the private contributions to districts in 
California: Fund 19 – Foundation Special Revenue Fund, Fund 57- Foundation Permanent Fund 
and Fund 73- Foundation Private-Purpose Trust Fund. (See Appendix C for descriptions). 
Revenue from each of these funds is summed together to get total private contributions per 
district. This total is then divided by the enrollment size of each district to get the measure of 
private contributions per student. 
 Independent variables used in this analysis include student enrollment, poverty 
percentage, and wealth percentage. These variables are defined the same as in the national data 
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sample. Data was obtained via the School District Demographic System. These measures were 
compiled by the National Center for Education Statistics in 2010. 
 Poverty percentage and wealth percentage serve as indicators of financial constraint, 
especially in relation to the tax structure in California. Districts with higher levels of poverty 
often bring in lower revenue from property taxes. The districts are often constrained, as they 
cannot exceed the revenue limit as set by the state. Thus, I conjecture that higher percentages of 
poverty indicate greater financial constraint on the district. I hypothesize that this increases the 
amount of philanthropic donations that the district received.  
 Wealth percentage, also serves to indicate a lack of financial constraint. Higher levels of 
wealth are often correlated with higher property values, which would result in more property tax 
revenue. Additionally, districts with high wealth concentration could indicate a higher supply of 
funds available. Thus, higher wealth indicates a lack of financial constraint. Due to a higher 
supply of funds, this should increase the amount of philanthropic funds a district receives. It is 
important, therefore, to look at both ends of the income distribution of a district to determine the 
impact on private contributions. Multivariate regressions were modeled for the 2011-2012 school 
year. The California Department of Education financial data included only 96 of the 845 total 
districts with any contributions included in the three funds that encompass private contributions. 
The rest of the districts had missing values for these funds. It is unknown whether data was 
missing from these districts or if the remaining districts had no revenue from private sources or 
because revenue was not reported. If these missing values were $0, it could indicate the trend 
that many district officials noted in the interview—private contributions going to an associated 
foundation rather than the district’s budget.  
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 Because of the uncertainty about how to interpret missing values, I estimated two 
different regressions. In the first model, the dependent variable was the log of private 
contributions per student with enrollment, wealth percentage, and poverty percentage as the 
independent variable. In this model, 96 districts with data reported were included. In the second 
model, the log of private contributions plus one became the dependent variable, to account for 
missing values as $0 in revenue from private sources. The same independent variables were 
considered in this analysis. This second model included 845 districts.  
 
XVII. California Results 
 The multivariate models estimated for California are shown in Table 11 below. In the 
model in which missing values of private contributions were excluded, we see a significant 
coefficient on enrollment (measured in thousands of students). For an increase of 1,000 students 
in the district, the model estimates a decline of 7.8% of the private contributions per student. 
This finding indicates that enrollment has significant contributions. However, as the impact is 
under 10 percent, for a large increase in enrollment size, it is not as substantial as anticipated.  
 The interviews with the districts indicated that officials commonly held that enrollment 
size altered the attractiveness for the district. However, the direction of the effect varied based on 
the official’s belief. Some, like those in Philadelphia, believed that donors who were planning on 
implementing certain initiatives wanted a large district. Districts with substantial student 
population allowed for initiatives to be run on many “test subjects.”  The more students in the 
district, the more data they could collect about the effectiveness of a certain program. Memphis 
noted that larger enrollments could be a deterrent for organizations. A large population of 
students can seem daunting for the rollout of an initiative. More actors are involved and there are 
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problems that arise with coordination efforts. Donors, therefore, might want to try a program at a 
particular school or a smaller district before expanding it to larger locales. Furthermore, when 
considered on a per-student basis, grants to smaller districts are worth more. 
 In terms of this analysis, it is impossible to determine how enrollment acts for all 
donations. Speaking to the district officials, they often talked about enrollment in relation to 
large-scale grants that aim to implement sweeping reforms for the districts. These include, but 
are not limited to Race to The Top, Wallace Foundation Grants, Gate Foundation grants, and 
many more. Enrollment may impact these types of donors, whereas it might have little to no 
effect on smaller donors. As many districts receive smaller scale donations from local 
organizations and businesses, enrollment may not be as much as a factor. When viewing 
California in this framework, the findings are consistent as enrollment size matters, just not in a 
large manner.  
 Coefficients of wealth percentage and poverty percentage are not significant. This could 
indicate that these are not significant variables that create variation in the amount of funding per 
pupil a district receives. These results do not support my hypothesis regarding financial 
constraints. Originally, I had expected districts with increased wealth, would have more supply 
of funds—translating into higher private contributions. On the flip side, I expected that higher 
poverty rates would indicate a higher need for funds—thus higher philanthropic contributions to 
meet this need.  
 The lack of significance can arise from multiple reasons. There may be indeed no 
relationship between the wealth rates or poverty rates and the overall private contributions. 
Another possibility is that the sample is not completely representative of all financial giving in 
California. This data consisted of the districts that reported private contributions directly to the 
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district. Interviews with district officials highlight the prominence of foundations as a primary 
source of private donations. Accurate measures of the private contributions might be missing, 
skewing the results of the relationships. Additionally, there may be other variables missing from 
the regression model. From the district interviews, it is apparent that a clear vision, competent 
leaders, and strong district capacity all aided in the process. These factors might be correlated 
with the wealth/poverty measures and with private contributions, but are not easily quantifiable. 
As a result, they are not captured in this model. 
 Similar explanations can be made for the lack of significant variables in the model, when 
missing values are treated as $0 in private contributions. In this model, it is very plausible that 
this does not capture all private contributions for these districts. Districts with missing values in 
these specific funds may prefer to funnel all donations to a 501 (c) (3). Thus, this model may not 
accurately capture the relationships between variables and amounts of funding. Additionally, 
there potentially can be missing variables from this model, influencing the results.  
 From these results for California specifically, we see that there is little evidence 
supporting the third hypothesis. Further investigation and alternative measures of financial 
constraint would need to be calculated to support or deny the hypothesis. In California, there are 
also not the same trends as we see in the national sample. As selection of districts expands to 
smaller districts and districts with wider ranges of poverty, some of the relations seen in the 
national sample also may disappear.  
 Further investigation is needed to see if trends from the national data are applicable in 
California. Even though mayoral control had a significant impact in the national data, it is not 
going to be seen in California.  Districts in the state, with the exception of Oakland in the early 
2000s, have largely avoided mayoral control. Thus, other factors serve to create a distinction in 
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the private fundraising efforts of districts.  Another measure of union strength would have to be 
created to identify variation in capacity across districts. This measure could then be used to test 
the second hypothesis in California. Lastly, the findings of the interview about capacity, 
competency and leadership would need to be quantified. This would allow me to identify not 
only which factors are important but also how important they are.  
 
Table	  11:	  California	  2010-­‐2011	  Private	  Contributions	  Dependent	  Variable	   Log	  (Private	  Contributions	  Per	  Student)	   Log	  (Private	  Contributions	  Per	  Student	  +	  1)	  Enrollment	  (In	  Thousands)	   -­‐.078***	  (.020)	   .000	  (.002)	  Wealth	  Percentage	   .015	   .004	  
	   (.030)	   (.006)	  Poverty	  Percentage	   -­‐.043	   -­‐.005	  
	   (.029)	   (.005)	  Constant	   5.310***	   .508***	  
	   (.821)	   (.146)	  N	   96	   845	  ***	  denotes	  significance	  at	  the	  1%	  level	  
 
XVIII. Conclusion 
  Philanthropy in education is a salient issue. Districts across the country are allocating 
staff, time, and resources to developing funds from private sources. Urban school districts across 
the country are dealing with a dual challenge – trying to fix failing school systems to close the 
achievement gap amidst lesser budgets each year. Schools are forced to find new revenue 
sources to continue providing the services to their students. At the same time, to fight against 
achievement gaps, school districts are adopting many new reforms – implementation of teacher 
evaluation systems, teacher compensation, and charter school collaborations. Often times, these 
reforms, are often supported and funded by large philanthropic foundations.  
 When examining the entire philanthropic landscape, it is evident that private 
contributions consist of much more than large multimillion grants. With prominent headlines 
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such as “Grants Back Public-Charter Cooperation”129 and “Seeking Aid, School Districts Change 
Teacher Evaluations,”130 the media places a lot of emphasis on large private contributions. 
However, data in Santa Ana paired with the information obtained through interviews, indicate 
otherwise. Districts often receive numerous smaller grants and contribution. Rather than large 
national foundations allocating these funds, the local community often raises private 
contributions. Parent Teacher Organizations, individuals, and local businesses donate money to 
school districts to further their ability to provide education. This money is allocated for 
instructional supplies, student scholarships, and field trip costs.  
 Differences exist not only in the types of private funds but also in the amounts districts 
receive. This study finds that mayoral control and wealth are two significant and substantial 
factors involved in the levels of private contributions a district receives. Districts undertaking a 
shift in governance received substantially more funds from private sources. Wealth percentage 
also was a significant independent variable, impacting the overall level of private contributions 
per student. Furthermore, from my interviews, I discovered that a combination of a strong vision, 
competent leadership, and district capacity contributed to how districts implemented grant 
seeking. Some districts have created efficient  
 As districts continue to be constrained by reduced budgets and rising enrollments, they 
have choices of how to continue providing education. To get the money they need, some districts 
undertake extensive efforts to raise private contributions. The interview with Baltimore stood out 
in my mind, in this regard. She noted, “Whether or not I believe that this is the right move for the 
district, this is a game. We need the money to serve our students.”131 Her comments indicate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Motoko Rich, “Grants Back Public-Charter Cooperation,” The New York Times, December 5, 2012. 
130 Motoko Rich, “Seeking Aid, School Districts Change Teacher Evaluations,” The New York Times, October 15, 
2012.	  
131 Baltimore Official, Interview by Author, Phone Interview, Philadelphia, PA, February 6, 2014. 
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feelings among many districts. The incentives of partnering with local companies and trying to 
make the district as attractive as possible to large foundations are too large to pass up for many. 
As a result, foundations and grant development offices work extensively in a strategic manner to 
bring in private contributions.  
By responding to such incentives and playing into this “game”, districts only solidify 
philanthropy’s role in public education. Districts acknowledge that partnering with local 
organizations and companies can serve to better their financial situation. With this benefit to be 
gained, districts will often adopt practices aimed at increasing revenue from these sources. 
However, in doing so, districts are bypassing their traditional funding sources. States can no 
longer supply districts with adequate funding, thus districts are cutting programs and finding 
substitute money to take its place.  
Education in the past has been public good, provided by local government entities--
school districts. With revenue from the federal, state, and local money, districts had resources to 
provide services to its students. However, in these tough times, states are failing to provide the 
funds to provide students across the nation with an adequate education. Are the states shirking on 
their responsibilities in providing a public good? Can this private revenue be a reliable or 
sustainable funding option? These are questions that remain unanswered. 
Municipal services have also seen a trend towards privatization in recent years. City 
government has typically provided for services such as libraries, waste management, and water. 
However, many cities, have adopted trends to either contract out or maintain public-private 
partnerships. Regardless of the form it takes, privatization often allows for the continuation of 
services that the population desires. The National League of Cities indicates that there are 
potential benefits to be had from this shift in provision. Privatization both increases efficiency 
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and reduces costs through competition and private sector expertise. On the other hand, there can 
be downsides. The city often has less control and there is the potential for conflicts of interests 
between the citizens and private entities.132  
Philanthropic giving also has implications for the district in regards to policy making. 
Large grants from national foundations can encourage change and reforms in the school districts. 
It is important to note that even though this does not fully encompass philanthropic giving to 
districts, these types of donations appear to have disproportionate influence. Districts are 
compelled to implement changes in terms of the hiring practices, management, and other aspects 
of school operations. Districts are responding to the programmatic work instigated by large 
foundations. The influence that these large institutions have causes a shift in the power dynamics 
of policy making. Even though this money alone is a drop in the bucket when compared to 
district budgets, philanthropic foundations have received a seat at the table in influencing 
districts.  
Furthermore, districts that successfully raise money can serve as models for other 
districts. From the interviews, it was apparent that with the right people in charge and efficient 
processes set in place, districts could strengthen their ability to raise private revenue. Therefore, 
other districts have the ability to improve and implement best practices across other districts. In 
doing so, these districts further solidify philanthropies place in the education world, because they 
are making development from private sources a priority.  
Districts can also shift governance from elected school boards and mayoral control. 
While state legislation is needed, it is not outside the realm of possibility. Seeing as this 
governance has attracted philanthropic donations, it can be a trend that might catch on in even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Stephanie Rozsa and Caitlin Geary, Privatizing Municipal Services, (Washington, DC: National League of Cities, 
2010).  
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more cities. It has even gained the support and attention of the federal government. Arne Duncan, 
speaking at a forum with mayors and superintendents, quipped, “At the end of my tenure, if only 
seven mayors are in control, I think I will have failed.”133 It appears that the potential for funds 
combined with federal pressure will contribute to more cities transitioning to this type of school 
control.  
Education in America today is markedly different from the past. No longer is a publicly 
funded school district run by an elected school board the norm. Across the country, shifts in 
government accompanied by new initiatives pushed by philanthropic foundations have taken 
hold. Changes in education come with a whole host of issues – shifts in power, new voices, and 
conflicts among vested interests. At the end of the day, the most important implication of these 
changes the effect they have on the service that school districts provide—the education of 
America’s 55 million children.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Michele McNeil, “Arne Duncan Advocates Mayoral Takeover of Big-City Districts,” Education Week, March 31, 
2009.  
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Appendix A: Santa Ana Unified School District Board of Education Minutes 
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Appendix B: School Districts in National Sample  
1. Detroit City  
2. Brownsville ISD 
3. Fresno Unified  
4. Milwaukee 
5. San Antonio ISD  
6. Dallas ISD  
7. Columbus City  
8. Philadelphia City 
9. Aldine ISD 
10. Cleveland Municipal 
11. Memphis 
12. San Bernardino City Unified  
13. Houston ISD  
14. El Paso ISD  
15. Atlanta   
16. Fort Worth ISD  
17. City of Chicago (SD 299) 
18. Sacramento City Unified  
19. District of Columbia Public Schools 
20. Baltimore City  
21. New York City 
22. Boston  
23. Austin ISD  
24. Los Angeles Unified  
25. Pasadena ISD 
26. Denver 
27. Santa Ana Unified  
28. Long Beach Unified 
 
Districts in Bold are mayoral control districts 
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Appendix D:  T-Test Tables 2009, 2010, with and without DC 
 Table	  1:	  Elected	  vs.	  Mayoral	  Control	  -­‐	  2009	  
Elected	   Mayoral	  Control	   Difference	  15.73	   49.79	   -­‐34.05	  [2.29,	  89.49]	   [1.75,	  169.82]	   (23.11)	  p-­‐value:	  0.1643	  	  Table	  2:	  Weak	  vs.	  Strong	  Union	  -­‐	  2009	  
Weak	   Strong	  	   Difference	  24.25	   33.82	   -­‐9.57	  [2.29,	  89.49]	   [1.75,	  169.82]	   (24.37)	  p-­‐value:	  0.7009	  
	  Table	  3:	  Lower	  vs.	  Higher	  Poverty	  -­‐	  2009	  
Lower	  Poverty	   Higher	  Poverty	  	   Difference	  49.69	   9.54	   37.15	  [1.75,	  169.82]	   [2.29,	  21.62]	   (22.24)	  p-­‐value:	  0.1188	  	  Table	  4:	  Lower	  vs.	  Higher	  Wealth	  -­‐	  2009	  
Lower	  Wealth	   Higher	  Wealth	  	   Difference	  11.49	   49.78	   -­‐39.29	  [2.29,	  89.49]	   [1.75,	  169.81]	   (22.09)	  p-­‐value:0.1067	  	  
2009	  Tables	  –	  Excluding	  DC	  
	  Table	  1a:	  Elected	  vs.	  Mayoral	  Control	  -­‐	  2009	  
Elected	   Mayoral	  Control	   Difference	  15.73	   49.12	   -­‐33.39	  [2.29,	  89.49]	   [1.75,	  169.82]	   (25.44)	  p-­‐value	  =	  0.2140	  	  Table	  2a:	  Weak	  vs.	  Strong	  Union	  -­‐	  2009	  
Elected	   Mayoral	  Control	   Difference	  19.44	   33.82	   -­‐13.38	  [2.29,	  89.49]	   [1.75,	  169.82]	   (26.02)	  p-­‐value	  =	  0.5906	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Table	  3a:	  Low	  vs.	  High	  Poverty	  -­‐	  2009	  
Low	   High	   Difference	  45.77	   9.54	   36.23	  [1.75,	  169.82]	   [2.29,	  21.62]	   (23.87)	  p-­‐value	  =	  0.1552	  	  Table	  4a:	  Low	  vs.	  High	  Wealth	  -­‐	  2009	  
Elected	   Mayoral	  Control	   Difference	  12.80	   42.52	   -­‐29.72	  [3.27,	  29.03]	   [1.75,	  169.82]	   (23.11)	  p-­‐value	  =	  0.2507	  	  	  	  
2010	  Tables	  
	  Table	  5:	  	  Elected	  vs.	  Mayoral	  Control,	  2010	  
Elected	   Mayoral	  Control	   Difference	  25.80	   74.25	   -­‐48.45	  [.75,	  123.83]	   [5.14,	  204.14]	   (28.49)	  P-­‐value:	  0.1084	  	  Table	  6:	  	  Weak	  vs.	  Strong	  Union,	  2010	  
Weak	   Strong	   Difference	  57.97	   29.12	   28.85	  [.95,	  204.14]	   [.75,	  164.17]	   (28.47)	  P-­‐value:	  0.3260	  	  Table	  7:	  	  Lower	  vs.	  Higher	  Poverty,	  2010	  
Lower	  Poverty	   Higher	  Poverty	   Difference	  61.98	   21.91	   40.07	  [.75,	  204.14]	   [.95,	  65.97]	   (27.42)	  P-­‐value:	  0.1632	  	  Table	  8:	  	  Low	  vs.	  High	  Wealth,	  2010	  
Low	  Wealth	   High	  Wealth	   Difference	  16.87	   67.02	   -­‐50.14	  [.94,	  39.80]	   [.74,	  204.14]	   (26.35)	  P-­‐value:	  0.0753	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2010	  Tables	  –	  Excluding	  DC	  
	  Table	  5a:	  Elected	  vs.	  Mayoral	  Control	  -­‐	  2010	  
Elected	   Mayoral	  Control	   Difference	  25.80	   48.27	   -­‐22.47	  [0.75,	  123.	  83]	   [5.14,	  164.17]	   (24.47)	  p-­‐value	  =	  0.3730	  	  Table	  6a:	  Weak	  vs.	  Strong	  Union	  -­‐	  2010	  
Weak	   Strong	  	   Difference	  37.09	   29.12	   7.97	  [0.95,	  123.83]	   [0.75,	  164.17]	   (26.02)	  p-­‐value	  =	  0.7356	  	  Table	  7a:	  Low	  vs.	  High	  Poverty	  -­‐	  2010	  
Low	   High	   Difference	  40.38	   23.43	   16.96	  [0.75,	  164.17]	   [0.95,	  65.97]	   (23.87)	  p-­‐value	  =	  0.4635	  	  Table	  8a:	  Low	  vs.	  High	  Wealth	  -­‐	  2010	  
Low	   High	   Difference	  16.87	   49.87	   -­‐33.00	  [0.95,	  39.81]	   [0.75,	  164.17]	   (21.32)	  p-­‐value	  =	  0.1424	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Appendix E: National Sample Regression Tables 
	  
National	  Sample	  2011	  Dependent	  Variable	   Log	  (Private	  Contributions	  Per	  Student)	  
	   2009	  Enrollment	  	   -­‐.001	  	   (.002)	  Mayoral	  Control	   1.414	  	   (1.122)	  Union	  Rank	   .011	  	   (.033)	  Wealth	  Percentage	   .046	  	   (.106)	  Poverty	  Percentage	   -­‐.022	  	   (.097)	  Constant	   2.217	  	   (4.409)	  N	   15	  
	  
National	  Sample	  (Excluding	  DC),	  2009-­‐2011	  Dependent	  Variable	   Log	  (Private	  Contributions	  Per	  Student)	  
	   2009	   2010	   2011	  Enrollment	   -­‐.002	   -­‐.002	   -­‐.001	  	   (.002)	   (.002)	   (.002)	  Mayoral	  Control	   1.526	   1.839*	   1.757	  	   (1.373)	   (.888)	   (1.045)	  Union	  Rank	   .014	   .034	   .043	  	   (.040)	   (.026)	   (.030)	  Wealth	  Percentage	   .063	   .267*	   .021	  	   (.151)	   (.135)	   (.179)	  Poverty	  Percentage	   -­‐.014	   .108	   -­‐.086	  	   (.114)	   (.082)	   (.108)	  Constant	   1.750	   -­‐3.921	   3.787	  	   (5.473)	   (3.736)	   (4.663)	  N	   14	   17	   17	  *	  denotes	  statistical	  significance	  at	  the	  10%	  level	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Appendix F: Interview Script 
 
For scheduled calls: Thanks so much for spending some time talking to me, I really appreciate the help 
with my research 
 
For unscheduled calls: Hi____, my name is Lucas Salzman and I’m a senior at the University of 
Pennsylvania who is working on a senior honors thesis about educational policy. I am calling because I 
am hoping that you would be willing to share with me some of your expertise to provide some 
background about the interactions between philanthropic organizations and school districts. Would you be 
willing to answer a few questions about your experience with philanthropic organizations in your school 
district? 
 
1. If you could just start off with just telling me about what your role at the district entails? How did you 
get involved in this position? 
 
2. How long has this position been at the district? How long has a grant development office existed? 
 
3. As I’m interested in the role of philanthropy/private donations, what types of grants/donations does the 
district typically receive? 
 
4. Does the school district seek out private donors or do donors/organizations approach the school 
district? (Mixture of both? If so, what is the distribution? Also, where do they find info about grants that 
they are seeking 
 
5. What are the sources of these grants? Large foundations? Parent donations? A Mixture? 
 
6. Are the donors tied to the district in any particular way (organization located in the city vs. national 
organizations donating) 
 
7. When applying for grants, what is the typical process (Length, application components, and other staff 
members implicated in the process?) 
 
8. What is the return of investment of your efforts? How many grants are approved? Does this affect the 
amount you apply for? 
 
9. When you receive these grant, are there any terms or stipulations attached to the funds? Are they tied to 
a particular school/program? Do they require teacher approval? 
 
10. What is the role of the school board in the grant process (Do they advise in the seeking of 
grants/donations or just approve) 
 
11. How are the funds accounted for in the budget? Is there a record of the donations the school district 
receives? 
 
12. Is there anything else you think that you think I should be aware of about philanthropic giving in your 
district? 
 
 
102 
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